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SITUATION

I

VESSELS AND NEUTRAL PORTS
States X and Y are at \var. Other states are neutral.
rrhere. have been several engagements bet\veen the vessels of \var of X and Y.
(a) State B declares that it will maintain strict
neutrality.
(1) The Xara, a cruiser of state X, has run upon a
submerged reef 4 1niles off .state B \vhile engaging vessels of \Yar of state Y, but, though da1naged, unsea\vorthy, and still pursued by vessels of Y, escapes to a
port of B. State B declines to allow repairs of any
kind in its \Vaters unless the ..<:yara be interned to the
end of the \var.
(2) State B declines to allo\v privileges in its harbors except such as are allo\ved to belligerent vessels
of war to the A ba, a neutral n1erchant vessel of state A,
\vhich is entirely loaded \vith freight belonging to state
X and bound for state A.
(3) State B declines to admit, except under the rules
for vessels of \var, the "'-Yebe \vhich clain1s to have been
transfor1necl fro1n a .supply ship of the navy of state
X and to be registered in state X as a merchant vessel.
(b) rrhe Dobo, a n1erchant vessel of stateD, has taken
a cargo in state E and delivered it at a port of state Y
and then has taken on a. ne\v cargo there and delivered
a part of this cargo at sea to a supply ship of the navy
of Y.
State X protests to .state E and to other neutral states
den1anding that the Dobo be treated as an auxiliar¥
of the na.vy of Y.
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(c) 'l'he . 1p
. ibi, a vessel of 'Yar of state X, enters a
naval port of state E in distress because short of fuel.
'l'he port is closed to conunerce. 'l'he co1n1nander of the
. .Yibt'. requests fuel for voyage to the nearest port of
state X.
'Vhat "·ouhl be the ]~nvful aetion in each case~
SOLUTIOX

(a) 1. 'fhe Xara 1uay re1nain in the port of neutral
state B for 24 hours unless state B has previously issued
~·pecial r~gulations.
During the 24-hour sojourn the
X ara n1ay 1nake such repairs as possible, using the personnel and 1naterial on board. ...._c\fter 24 hou"!:~ the .LYara
~hould be interned.
2. Unless neutral state B has previously issued special regulations, it 1nay not decline to allo·w to the Aba
the usual privileges granted to neutral n1rrch~nt vessels
jn its harbors.
3. If neutral state B and belligerent state X are not
bound by special treaty agree1nent, and if state B has
nut previously issued special regulations, state B 1nay
legally declin~ to adn1it, except under the rules for
vessels of war, the X ebe 'v hich has Leen transfonned
±rom a supply to a 1nerchant vessel.
(b) There is no obligation on the part of state E or
other neutral states to treat the Dobo as an auxiliary
of the navy of state Y.
(c) If tbe Xibl, a vessel of "·ar of state X~ enters in
distress a closed port of neutral state E, the Xibi should
he interned or 1nay be allo,ved or reqnil·ed to depart
under pledge to take no further part in the ·war.
NOTES

TT alue of preh"m.inary agree1nents.-'Vhile it is possible to regard the Hague Conventions of 1899 and
1907 and oth~r conventions as falling short of stating
the principles "·hich n1ight be in accord "·ith justice.
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it is essential to consider that the princi pies o£ justice
are· not yet standardized, and w·hat seenis to one state as
just 1nay not be so regarded by other states, and 'vhat
is recognized at one period as just may not have the
sa1ne appeal under other conditions or at another period.
It 1nay be 1nuch more in1portant that so1ne rules o£
conduct which are generally accepted be agreed upon in
ndvance, though these are not ideal, rather than that no
~gree1nent exist upon any aspect o£ a subject, and the
".,.hole matter be the subject o£ controYersy in a ti1ne o£
crisis when any agree1nent eyen upon 1ninor points is
d]fficult.
The value o£ agree1nents in adYance 1nay 'vell be illustrated by the settle1nent o£ the Dogger Bank incident in
1904 through a Comn1ission o£ Inquiry provided for in
Hague ConYention I o£ 1899. This conYention 'vas not
ideal in its provisions~ and w·as after this test n1uch
n1ouified in 1907, but it did offer a 1neans £or settling
a difficulty to the satisfaction o£ the parties at a ti1ne
w·hen relations 'vere severely strained and when, i£ the
convention had not already existed, it 'vould haYe been
doubtful whether negotiations a£ter the eYent would
have been successful.
Three-mile lhnit.-,Vhile n1uch 'vider limits than :3
1niles have been clai1ned £or jurisdiction o£ the coast
state over marginal seas, yet 3 miles at least is usually
recognized as a minilnum. During the '\Torld 'Var some
states, accustomed to claim in time o£ peace wider limits,
renounced these claims when the duties o£ maintaining
neutrality in the wider areas became too burdensome.
No state has seemed inclined to claim a belt o£ jurisdiction in the n1arginal sea o£ less than 3 miles. There is
a general acceptance o£ the right o£ a shore state to
exercise jurisdiction beyond 3 miles £or revenue and
other national purposes. ~Iany treaties and domestic
laws prescribe 3 miles as the recognized limit o£ jurisdiction. rrhe Convention R-elating to the N on£ortifica-
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tion and Neutralization of the .A. alancl Islands, GeneYa,
October 20, 1921, provides that:
''The territorial waters of
to extentl for a distance of
water mark on the islands,
~uhmerged."
(0 L. N. T. S.,

the Aaland !~lands are considered
three marine n1iles from the lowislets, and reefs not pennanently
p. 212.)

Snb1nerged reefs outside the 3-Inile li1nit are usually
considered to be in the high sea and have been so regard~d in international negotiations though wider
clain1s have been Ina de (23 A1nerican Journal of International La\v, Spec. Sup. (1929), pp. 275 et seq.).
Repairs in neutJ·a.l JJOrt.-\,Then YesE=els \vere slo\v
sailing and dependent upon winds and tides, ordinary
repairs essential to sea\vorthiness \Yere easily deterInined and the line betw·een da1nages due to natural
caus<:s and those due to acts of the enemy \vere usually
distinguishable. \Vith the introduction of aids to navigation w·hich made vessels largely independent of winds
and tides, differences of opinion as to the extent and
tharacter of repairs in neutral ports on vessels of war
becan1e coinrnon. The old <:xpression "perils of the sea"
required ne\v interpretations, but usually \Vas held to
cover cases of distress similar to those granted to sailing
vessels.
The 24-hour sojourn \vould rarely be sufficient for
repairs and \Vas a comparatively recent restriction,
though short sojourns were not questioned unless resort
to shore resources for aid heca1ne necessary. It \vas
generally regarded as unnecessary for the neutral authorities to concern themselves \Yith \vhat "rent on
within a vessel of \var during its la,vful sojourn in
port provided it did not involve aiel in the \Yay of materiel or personnel from the shore, i. e., so far as the vessel
of war \vas a self-sufficient unit, it \vas free of neutral
port regulations. rfhe cause of damages \Vhich might
be repaired by the ship itself \vithin the la\vful period
of its sojourn \Vas not regarded as a concern of the
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neutral-port authorities. 'fhe reason :for sojourn beyond the 24-hour lilnit "~ould be a n1atter to be presented to the neutral :for consideration as would the·
reason :for requesting aid :fro1n shore.
The ground :for extension o:f the period o:f sojourn
or other special privileges caine in a general 'vay to be
stated as :for repairs due to da1nages :from natural causes
in distinction :from damages due to con1bat or acts of
the enemy. As "Tas stated in the A1neric(lln case in discussing the rules o:f the Treaty o:f 'Vashington, 1871.
''The repairs that hutnanity demand can be giYen, but no repairs should add to the strength or efficiency of a vessel, be~'ond
what is absolutely necessary to gain the nearest of its own
ports." (1U31 NaYal 'Var College, International Law Situations, p. 88; I Papers relating to the Treaty of 'Vashington,.
p. 71.)
"As the vessel enters the port, so is she to leaYe it, \Vithout
addition to her effective power of doing injury to the other
belligerent." ( lbhl.)

Hague o·onvention XIII, 1907.-Article I of Hague
Conyention XIII of 1907 states the general principle of
the relations of belligerents to neutrals in ti1ne o:f naYal
"Tar as :follo"'s :
"Belligerents arc bound to respect the sovereign rig·ht::; of
neutral Po\Yers and to abstain, in neutral territory or neutral
water~, from all acts which would constitute, on the part of
the neutral Powers which kno\vingly pertnitted then1, a nollfulfillment of their neutrality."

Article 17 applies particularly to repairs in neutral
ports:
"In neutral ports and roadsteads belligerent ships of war can
carry out only such re1)airs as are absolutely necessary to rendet~
them ~eaworthy, and can not add in any n1anner whatsoever
to their fighting fcn·c. The neutral authorities shall decide what
revairs are necessary, and these must be carried out with the
least possible delay."

Vie1-os on sojouJ•n.-'fhere haYe been t'vo points of
Yie"r particularly en1phasized 'vhich appeared :fro1n titne
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to tin1e in discussions of the Institute of International
I...~a,v and the Second Hague Conference of 1907.
So1ne fayored the sa1ne treahnent in a neutral port
for a vessel of "·ar and a 1nerchant vessel provided the
vessel of "·ar did not enter the neutral port as a part
of a naval operation. It "·as very properly objected
that for the neutral authorities to be called upon to
deter1nine 'vhat acts of a vessel of 'var or vessels of 'var
of belligerents "·ere connected 'vith naval operations
'vonld be to put upon such authorities an impossible
task and to lay the1n open to recri1ninations fron1 both
parties. It "·as also sho,vn that it 'vould be presumptuous to asstnne that in ti1ne of 'var any n1ovement of a
vessel of "~ar of a belligerent "~as not connected with
naval operations.
The second point of view 'vas based on an admission
that the responsibilities of the neutral should be defined and that the Ininimtun of responsibility in discrimination should rest upon neutral authorities. This
llad already 'been set forth in the 24-hour rule of sojourn
'vith rules for departure of opposing belligerents. The
taking of fuel ·was 1nore clearly defined though rules of
the Hague Convention XIII left opporttmity for wide
difference in practice.
It was acbnitted that a state n1ight close its ports to
vessels of 'var or make such regulations as it sa'v fit.
It "·as recognized that it 'vould be impossible in 1nost
cases for the neutral to determine the treatment to be
Recorded to a vessel of 'var on the basis of the cause of
its entrance for this 'vould imply a kno,vledge not
usually obtainable, and if obtainable 'vould make judgn1ent upon it open to difference of opinion. vVhat might
seem a military reason to the neutral authorities m_ight
~eem to the belligerent to be without n1ilitary significance beyond that of every n1ovement of the vessel. The
general rule, therefore, 'vhich gained in fav-or was that
entrance and sojourn of 24 hours 'vithout. use of port
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facilities other than refueling and taking on o:f supplies 'vould be allo,ved. Internment :for the duration
of the war would :follow unless there was special ground
!'lot due to military causes for granting a longer period
o:f sojourn.
Those principles 'vere particularly applied and becaine n1ore clearly defined during the Russo-Japanese
,.Var (1904 Naval \'Tar College, Intern~tional La'v Situations, pp. 79-93; 1905 Naval'': ar CollE-ge, Inte111ational
Law Topics, pp. 154-170).
The reasons :for granting any period o:f sojourn or a
period beyond 24 hours is now considered to be within
the competence o:f the neutral authorities, and these authorities must act in such n1anner as not io make the
port liable to be regarded as an enen1y bas0, and 1nust
use due diligence in preventing such use while not denyjug the treabnent to which belligerents are entitled
under the principles o:f humanity.
Regulations on repairs.-States have :fron1 ti1ne to
ti:ne made pronouncements in regard to repairs. After
the Hague conventions, Den1nark, Norway~ aEcl Sweden
jointly agreed upon rules of neutrality, Decen1ber 21~
1912, which were separately adopted.
Article 5 (a) provided that"In the ports or roadsteads of the kingdom, belligerent 'var
cau repair their dan1ages only to the extent necessary
f0r the security of navigation, and they can not increase their
military force in any manner whatsoev-er. The authorities of
the kingdOin will indicate the nature of the repairs to be 1nade.
The repairs should be completed as rapidly as possible." ( 1917
Naval War College, Int. Law Documents, p. 185.)
~essels

The Habana Convention, 1028, on
jty, article 9, states that-

~fariti1ne

Neutral-

"Damaged belligerent ships shall not be permitt-ed to 1nake
repairs in neutral ports b-eyond those that are essential to the
continuance of the voyage and which in no degree constitute an
j ncrease in its military strength.
"Damages which are found to have been produced by the
(\nemy's fire shall ii1 no case be repaired.
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''The neutral state shall ascertain the nature of the n~vair::;
to be n1ade and will see that the~· are 1na<le as rapidly a~ po~
~ible."
(Heport, Dele~ates of the United States, SixUt Int~rna
t:ional Conference of American States, p. 2HJ.)

Of this Habana convention the report said that th~
original draft before the subconunittee had contained
son1e provisions "intended to change existing practice
in the interest of neutrals." Objections \'{Ore 1nade to
'~rariations fron1 genernl usage." Desire \ras expressed
that the proposals should confor1n to the practice of
nations.
"The result was n modified draft, in large mea:-;ure that of the
thirteenth convention of the Second I-Iagne Pe~tce Conference of
J V07, with sundry n1odifica tions and athlitions in order to take
note of the measures which neutrals ·had taken to lH'P~etTe their
lights during the 'Yorld \Var. As finally drafted aud ori:.!inall.'~
ad011ted, the project presupposed a war, in which the .Am~ri<.:an
Republics would be neutral. For this reason it '.Vas iiHlispt:->11:-;nhle
tba t the vractice of nations should he ~trictl.\· ob:-:(•rvP<l. a~; it
'.vould be undesirahle on the vart of the American ~ta h·:' to
~ ttempt to change the general rights of all neutrals by a special
agreement of their own." (Ibid., p. 18.)

Brazil's 1-.ules on 1·epairs, 1914.-1"'he General Rules
of Neutrality issued by Brazil, August 4, 1914, provided
for sojourn in Brazilian port longer than 24 hour:-; in
case of urgent need.
"ART. 7th.

* * *

"The case of urgent need justifies the staying of the wnr:'hip
or privateer at the vort longer than twenty-four hours:
''1. If the revairs needed to render the ship seaworthy cannot be made within that time;
"2. ~n case of serious danger on account of stress of weather;
"3. "rhen threatened by some enemy craft cruising off the
port of refuge.
"These three circumstances will be taken into consic.lera tion
by the Government in granting a delay· for the refugee shiv."

*

*

*

*

*

*

"ART. 13th. The belligerent warships are allowed to repair

their damages in the ports and harbors of Brazil only to the
extent of rendering them seaworthy, without in anr wi'Se
augmenting their military power.
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"The Brazilian na Yal authorities will ascertain the nature anrl
extent of the proper repairs, which shall be 1nade as promptly
as possible."
(1916 ~aYal 'Var College, International Law
Topics, p. 10.)

of Professor H yde.-Professor Hyde
points out that the rules in regard to intern1nent lea ,. . c
a degree of uncertainty in regard to the nature of repairs 'vhich 1nay be pern1itted in a neutral port, saying :
)Statc1nen-t

"It should be obserye<l that the Hague Convention makes no
clif'tinction or limitation with reference to the causes of da1nage.
A neutral State is thus regarded as free from an obligation
to prevent the making of rerlairs necessitated by the conduct of
the opposing belligerent, provided they 111erely serve to effect
~eaworthiness.
In a strict sense, any repairs productive of seaworthiness, irrespectiYe of the cause of d;unage, necessarily
increase the fighting force of the recipient if it is otherwise
capable of engaging in hostilities. To render, for example, an
armed submarine fit to keep the sea, or to reach its nearest
home port, may suffice also to enable the vessel to resume the
offensiYe with the full 1neasure of its strength.
''In brief, the existing rules draw a line of distinction which,
r.. t the present time, [1922] appears to be insufficient to prevent
a neutral port offering permitted an<l requisite repairs from be('Oming in fact a base of operations. The question presents itself,
therefore, whether in any reconsideration of existing regulations
and of the practice growing out of them, maritime States should
endeavor to cut clown the privileges of repair, and proportionally lessen the opportunity for neutral territory so to augment
the fighting power of belligerent ships." (2 Hyde. International
Law chiefly as interpreted an<l applied by the "Cnited States,
p. 781.)

(a) (1) Tlze "X(f;ra" in po1·t of B.-It is generally
held that a sub1nerged reef n1ore than 3 1niles off the
coast is in the high seas. Son1e states have Inaintained
in ti1ne of peace w·icler clain1s to jurisdiction, but in
tin1e of 'Yar the obligations beco1ne 1nore burdenso1ne .
.A._ state "·hich I nay cla:in1 a w·ider jurisdiction for fish<)ries, reYenue, or other reasons 'Yould often cln in1 three
1nile jurisdiction only under 'Yar conditions. Cotnplic·ations 1nay arise "·hen contiguous states clain1 different
lin1its, as belligerents Inay haYe to accon11noclate t hetn81178-36--2
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to Yariations 'vhich see1n to thetn arbitrary and
y,·hich 1nay cau~e unnecessary friction.
In the case of the Xa1·a, state B in achnitting the
cruiser to its port "·ithout in11necliate internnll)nt sho"·s
that it does not regard the engage1nent at the tin1e the
...{Yara; runs upon the reef as 'vithin its limits.
The . .Ya1·a "·as still pursued by Yessels of State Y
"·hen it escaped to the port of State B. 1"he. use of
this port of neutral State B as a port of refuge to
!_)scape capture "·ould 1nake the Xa1·a liable to internn1ent. Article 22 of the General Rules of Neutrality
issued by Brazil, .t\.ugust 4, 1914, states, "'B~lligerent
"·arships that are chased by the ene1ny, and, avoiding
attack~ seek refuge in a Brazilian port w·ill be detained
there and disar1ned." (1916, N' a val \'Tar College, International La,v Situations, p. 13.) This rule does per1nit
departure of Yessels if their officers pledge not to engage
in "·ar operations. 'The Danish order of Decetnber 20,
1912, in the article relating to repair reads. " . .:\Jl repair
relating to the fighting capacity of the vessel is prohibited." (Ibid., p. 51.) Rules similar to the above
'vere issued by other states during the \Vorld \Var.
For repairs beyond these 'vhich could be n1ade ""ithin
24 hours and for repairs involving use of resources from
neutral sources, prior appro.val and authorization 'vould
be required, and for such aid the neutral 'vould assume
the responsibility. niatters relating solely to the internal
econo1ny of a vessel of "·ar of a belligerent during its
24-hour sojourn are w·ithin the control of the coinInander.
1Ventral and belligerent rights.-The rights and obligations of belligerents to"·arcl neutrals are not the
san1e as or correlative to the rights and obligations of
neutrals to,vard one another. 1"he fact that a belligerent may have a right to capture or destroy a vessel
under certain circtunstances places no obligation upon
a neutral to take any action in regard to this vessel.
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It has often happened that a belligerent has suggested that neutrals take such action as would facilitate
the conduct of 'var against an opponent, e. g., restrict
the move1nents or acts of enemy vessels.
On August 27, 1918, the Secretary of State of the
United States in a con11nunication to the Charge in
Norway 1nade a suggestion to the N or,Yegian Govern1nent as to the regulation o£ the use o£ N or,vegian
territorial ""aters, saying:
"The Norwegian Government cannot be unminllful of the
fact that in the prosecution of the war being waged against
the Central Powers the Governtnent of the United States is
transporting across the Atlantic Ocean hundreds of thousands
of troops and inunense quantities of supplies and munitions
for their maintenance and use. Possessed of this knowledge
the Norwegian GoYernment 1nust perceive that so long as GerInan sub1nnrines are permitted to pass UIHnolestecl through the
coastal ,vaters of Norway into the Atlantic Ocean fro1n the
North Sea, the 1nilitary forces of the United. States, the
supplies necessary for their subsistence, and the munitions
required for their operations will be, while upon the high seas,
in serious danger of submarine attack and destruction.
"In view of the 1nenace to A1nerican interests which will
result from the free passage of submarines through the territorial waters of Norway, the GoYernn1ent of the United States
believes that tlie Norwegian GoYernment will realize the obligation which rests upon it to prev~nt by e"\·er~· 1neans in its
po·wer the passage of German submarines through waters ·within
the jurisdiction of Norway. Furthermore it cannot fail to
realize that if Norwegian waters are used by belligerent subnlarines as a rendezvous whence they can freely pass into the
Atlantic Ocean for hostile purposes the waters so used may
justly be considered a bnse of naval operations, the establishnlent of which within Norwegian jurisdiction the Government
of the United States belieYes to be entirely contrary to the
will and intention of the GoYern1nent of Norway.
"In the circum:::;tances the Government of the United States
most earnestly urges the Norwegian Government to·· take all
necessary steps to prevent a situation which 1night cause serious
embarrassment to both Governments which would be deeply
regretted by the Government of the United States as it has
only the 1nost friendly feeling for the Government and people
of Norway and is desirous to prevent as well as to remove all
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causes of differences affecting the good relations of the two
countries in their intercourse with each other." (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1918, Supplement I, volume II, p. 1783.)

In pres~nting the suggestion, the Charge took occasion to en1phasize several points, ancl referring to the
passage of snb1narines said,
"(3) That as stated in Iny note the United States believed
Norwegian territorial waters could justly be regarded as a base
of naval operations if they are used by German submarines as
a rendezvous, whence the latter can freely pass into the Atlantic
Ocean for hostile purposes. ::\Iinister for Foreign Affairs rather
questioned the valadity of this statement; I said that so long
as the Norwegians failed to prevent the passage of submarines
through coastal waters, there was no essential difference between the situation created for German submarines in N"orweglan waters by the protection afforded them by our respect
for Norwegian neutrality, which was [restraining] us, and the
situation in which submarines found themselves \Vhen under the
protection of German fortresses and Inine fiellls at their Gennau
base. ~Iinister for Foreign Affairs admitted the force of the
contention somewhat reluctantly." (Ibid., p. 178-!.)

In the course of a reply on Scptcn1bcr 28, 1918, tltP
X or"~egian ~Iinister of Foreign 1\..ffairs said:
''The thirteenth Jlague convention of 1907 1n·ovides ex rues sly
in article 10 that a country's neutrality is not called in question
1Jr the mere fact that belligerent war vessels are permitted to
}mss through its territorial \Yaoters. No exception is Inade in
this lH'OYision of the convention for submarine boats. The fact
that Norway by a don1estic regulation has conditionally forbidden such war yessels to rmss through her territorial waters
does not in any respect change the position of Norway under
international law and giyes the belligerents no right to make a
clemanll on the Norwegian Government which is not based on
general rules of international law. The regulation in question,
as state<l in n1y note of August 20, was called forth exclusiyely
by con:-;ideration of Norway's own interests, and just as a similar regulation has [not] been made by all other neutral states,
so Xorwa;y would also be fully entitled by international law to
revoke this regulation if, according to circumstances, at a given
time Norwa~· should no longer find it compatible with her
interests.
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''There is no inforn1ation before the Norwegian Government
1hat Norwegian territorial waters are being used by foreign subnmrines as a 'rendezvous'. None of the circumstances surrounding the cases of sojourn of submarines in territorial waters
which the Norwegian naval authorities have observed or been
informed of or which are brought by the Blitish Government
confidentially to the knowledge of the Norwegian Government,
indicate that these cases involved anything else than passage."
(Ibid., p. 1786.)

Later the N or\vegian Government announced that it
had mined its territorial waters.
Attitude of the United States, 1914.-By a circular of
the Depa1'tment of State of October 15, 1914, replying
to queries upon the right to supplying articles of war~
the attitude of the Govern1nent \Vas stated.
"In the first place it should be understood that, generally
f-:Jleaking, a citizen of the United States can sell to a belligerent
~wvernment or its agent any article of commerce ·which he
pJ~ases.
He is not prohibited from doing this by any rule of
jnternational la·w·, by any tr·eaty provisions, or by anv statute
of the United States. It 1nakes no difference Y\'hether the
articles sold are exclusiYely for war purposes, such as fireanns,
f'xplosives, etc., or are foodstuffs, clothing, hor~es, etc., for the
1!Se of the army or naYy of the belligerent.
"Furthermore, a neutral goyern1nent is not ~om11ell<:cl by internatioilal law, by treaty, or by statute to 11reYent these sales
to a belligerent. Such sales, therefore, by American citizens do
r1ot in the least affect the neutrality of the United States.
·'It is true that such articles as those 1nentioned are considered contraband ancl are, outside the territorial jurisdiction
of a neutral nation, subject to seizure by an enemy of the purchasing goYernment, but it is the enemy's duty to preyent the
articles reaching their destination, not the duty of the nation
·whose citizens haYe sold then1. If the enemy of the purchasing
11ation happens for the time to be unable to do this that is for
li.iln one o£ the n1isfortunes of war; the inability, howeYer, imposes on the neutral goYernment no obligation to preYent the sale.
"Neither the President nor any executiYe dPpartm·ent of the
Government possesses the legal authority to interfere in any way
Ydth trade between the people of this country and the territory
of the belligerent. Th~is-iltHtet-of-Gong. t!ess-coafei~ng-sucil
M-flH~-helliger~t.
There is no act of Congress conferring such
authority or prohibiting traffic of this sort with Eurovean nations,
although in the case of neighboring American Hepublics Con-
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gress ha~ gin·n the Pre~idcnt powpr to JH'Oelaim an embargoon arm~ and ammunition whPn in hi~ ju<lgmpnt it would tt.•IHl
to pren?nt eh·il strife.'' (lUlU Xa,·al \Yar CollPgP, Int~rnational
Law Topics, p. DG.)
Britl~rsh

position, February 10~ 1915.-In a long note
of Sir Ed\Yard Grey, of February 10, 1!)1~3. there \Yas
an atten1pt to justify the detention of 1\.n1erican cargoes
destined for neutral European ports. In this note \Yas
foreshado\Yed the attitude \Yhich subsequently took fonn
in retaliatory 1neasures. Follo\Ying explanation of
1nany British acts, the note concludes:
"I have giYen these indications of the policy whkh we have
followed, bec:t use I eannot helv feeling that if the facts were
more fully k:wwn as to the efforts which we ha,·e mnde to
avoid inflicting ~~ny avoidable injury on neutral interest:-;, many
of the complaints which have been received by the administration in 'Yashington, and which led to the protest whid1 J·our
excellency hnnded to me on the 28th December would never
have been made. ~Iy hope is that ·when the facts whieh I have
set out above are realized, and when it is seen that our naval
operations have not dhninishc<l A.Inerican tra(lc with neutral
eountries, and that the lines on which we hnve acted arc consistent with the fundamental principles of internatimw.l law, it
will be apparent to the Gm·ernment and pe011le of th~ United
States that His ::\Iajesty's Goveru1ncnt have hitherto end~avoured
to exercise their belligerent rights with every 110:-;sible con~idera
tion for the interests of neutrals.
"It will still be our endea,·our to avoid injury and lo:-;s to
neutrals, but the announcement by the Gennan Government of
their intention to sink n1erchant vessels and their cargoes withuut verification of their nationality or chnracter, and without
n1aking any pro,·ision for the safety of noncombatant crews or
giving then1 a chance of saving their lives, bas made it necessary
for IIis :Majesty's Government to consi<l~r what measures they
should adopt to protect their interests. It is impossible for one
bellige1·cnt to depart from rules and preccllcnts and for the other
to remain bound by then1." (1015 U. S. Foreign Relationst
Supplement, p. 283.)

Acts of 1935 and 1936.-0n .A..ugust 31, 1935, a joint
resolution of Congress \vas adopted:
"Providing for the prohibition of the export of arms, ammunition, and implements , of war to belligerent countries; the prohi-
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bition of the transportation of arms, ammunition, and implements of war by vessels of the United States for the use of
uelligerent- states; for the registration and licensing of persons
engaged in the business of tnanufacturing, exporting, or hnporting arms, ammunition, or implements of war; and restricting trayel by American citizens on belligerent ships during
\Var."

Detailed regulations \Yere Inade :for carrying into
effect this resolution.
Another joint resolution, approYed February 29, 1936,
elaborated the resolution of August 31, 1935, and extended the period o:f the operation to Ma.y 1, 1937.
Changed Am_erioan attitude, 1935-36.-The President
o:f the United States had on October 5, 1935~ declared
that a state o:f \var unhappily existed bet\veen Ethiopia
and the Kingdom o:f Italy" and under the joint resolution o:f FE.bruary 29, 1936, he proclai1ned on the san1~
date "that a state o:f war unhappily continues to exist
bet-\veen Ethiopia and the Kingdom o:f Italy."
Under this proclamation persons within the jurisdiction o:f the United States \Yere to abstain :from export
o:f arms, am1nunition, or in1plements o:f war to Ethiopia
or Italy or Italian possession or to a neutral port for
transshipn1ent.
The changed attitude of the Governinent of the
United States is evident in the detailed list o:f articles
na1ned under the categories o:f "arn1s, ammunition, and
implements o:f \Yar." This list is as follo\vs:
"Ccttegory I
"(1) Rifles and carbines using ammunition in excess of caliber
.22, and barrels for those weapons ;
"(2) 1\Iachine guns, automatic or autoloading rifles, and machine pistols using ammunition in excess of caliber .22, and
barrels for those \Yeapons ;
" ( 3) Guns, howitzers, and n1ortars of all calibers, their
mountings and barrels;
" ( 4) Anununition in excess of caliber .22 for the arms enumerated under (1) and (2) above, and cartridge cases or bullets
for such ammunition ; filled and unfilled projectiles or forgings
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vrojectilcs for the arms enumerated under ( 8) aboYe;
with a web tllickne~s of 0.015 inch or greater for
the projediles of the .arms e11umerated under (3) above;
" (f)) Grenades. bombs, torpedoes and mines, filled or unfilled,
a lid apparatus for their use of discharge;
" ( 6) Tank~, ·military armored Yellicles, and armored trains.
propellnnt~

''Catcgor·y II
''Ye:--sel~

of war of all kinds, including aircraft earriers and

~nbmarines.

''Category III
'' ( 1) Aircraft,

assembled or dismantled, both lleaYier and
lighter than air, which are designed, adapted, and intended for
flerial combat by the use of machine guns or of artillery or for
the carrying and dropping of bombs, or which are equipped with,
u:..· which by reason of design or eonstruction are prepared for,
.any of the UPIJliauces referred to in paragraph (2) below;
'' (2) Aerial gun rnounts and frames, bomb racks, torpedo
carriers, and bomb or torpedo release mechanisms.

"Category IY
"(1) Revolvers and automatic pistols using aunnunition in
exce~s

of caliber .~2 ;
"(2) A1nmunition in excess of caliber .22 for the arms enunlerDted undf'r (1) aboYe, and cartridge cases or bullets for such
ammunition.
"Catego1·y V

" ( 1) Aircraft, assembled or distn:lntled, both heavier and
lighter than air, other than those ineluded in Category III;
" ( 2) Propellers or air screws, fuselages, hulls, wings, tail
units, and under-carriage units;
" ( 3) Aircraft engine~, assembled or unassembled.

"Ca.tegory VI
''(1) LiYens, projectors, and flame throwers;

·· ( 2) ::.\lustard .gas ( dichlorethylsulphide), lewisite ( chloroviuyldiehlorarsine and dichlorodivinylchlorarsine), ethyldichlorarsi ne, methyldichlor~rsine, eth~·Iiodoacetate, brombenzylcyanide,
diphenolchlorarsine, and dyphenolcyanoarsine.
''And I do hereb~· enjoin upon all officers of the United States,
charged with the execution of the laws thereof, the utmost
diligence in I1l'eventing Yiolations of the said joint resolution, and
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this n1y proclan1ation issued thereunder, and in bringing to trial
and punishment any offenders against the same."

Bellige1·ent cargoes.-Ordinarily a neutral state 1s
concerned 'vith clearance o:f vessels loaded in its ports
:for belligerent destinations. The use o:f its ports as
~ources o:f supply to belligerents n1ay under certain circumstances constitute those ports bases :for belligerent
operations which 'vould make the neutral state liable.
Cargoes bonncl :for :foreign neutral ports :from a :foreign
neutral port regardless o:f the nature o:f the cargo, i:f not
under son1e do1nestic restriction, as perhaps opiun1 in
son1e states, are not liable to interference or delay and
the neutral carrier has no responsibility other than for
port regulations.
The act o:f niarch 4, 1915, by ,vhich the United States
regulated the use o:f its ports, einpo"~ered the President
to direct that clearance be 'vithhelcl"from any vessel, American or foreign, which he has reasouable
cause to believe to be about to carry fuel, arms, ammunition,
men, or supplies to any warship, or ten<ler, or sup11ly ship of a
belligerent nation, in violation of the obligations of the United
States as a neutral nation.'' (38 Stat., Pt. I, 1926; 1929 NaYal
\Var College, International Law Situations, p. 136.)

vVhere the sole question in regard to treabnent o:f a
neutral Yessel relates to its cargo, the destination is the
essential :factor.
In a men1oranclum o:f the Department o:f State o:f
Septen1ber 19, 1914, it was said:
"6. A merchant vessel. laden with naval supplies, clearing
frorn a port of the United States for the port of another neutral
nation, which arrives at its destination and there discharges
its cargo, should not be detained if, on a second voyage, it
takes on board another cargo of similar nature.
"In such a case the port of the other neutral nation may be
a base for the naval operations of a belligerent. If so, and
even if the fact is notorious, this Government is under no obligation to prevent the shipment of naval supplies to that port.
Comnwrce in rnunitions of war between neutral nations cannot
as a rule be a basis for a clailn of unneutral conduct, eYen though
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there is a strong presumption or actual knowledge that the neutral state, in whose port the supplies are discharged, is per·
mitting its territory to be used as a base of supply for belligerC'nt warships. The duty of preventing an unneutral act rests
C'ntirely upon the neutral state whose territory is being used
<lS such a base.
''In fact this principle goes further in that, if the supplies were
f-=hipped directly to an established naval base in the territory or
under the control of a belligerent, this Government would not
be obli~ated by its neutral duty to limit such sbipmel1ts or detain
or otherwise interfere with the merchant vessels engaged in
that trade. A neutral can only be charged with unneutral
conduct when the supplies, furnished to a belligerent warship.
are furnished directly to it in a port of the neutral or through
naval tenders or merchant vessels acting as tenders departing
from such port." (191G Naval 'Var College, International Law
Topics, p. 92.)

Public property on vessel.-It n1ight be possible :for
i.he entire cargo o:f a merchant vessel to belong to the
state whose flag it is flying or to another state. Certain
states have considered private property in the commonly
accepted sense as no longer recognized. 'fhe Union o:f
Socialist Soviet Republics, 'vhile not recognizing some
of the w·idely accepted doctrines in regard to property,
has by reciprocal treaties agreed to aet in accord with
international law in trea.hne.nt of property (Taracouzio,
Soviet Union and International Law, chap. IX).
Even in the 'Vorld 'Var and earlier. vessels 'vere chartered entire b~r states and loadecl 'Yith cargoes belon~
illg to the state. The unratified declaration of London,
1909, in article 46 provided for the liability of a neutral
vessel chartered entire by a belligerent government stating that it should 'be the san1e as a merchant vessel of
the enemy. The report o:f the conference explains this
clause:
"The vessel is chartered entire by the enemy Government. It
is then wholly at ·disposal of the GoYernment, whieh can ·use l1er
for different Jlllrposes more or less directly con1wctcd with the
war, 11otahly for purposes of transportation; such i~ the position
of colliPrs whieh a(·company a bellig-C'rent flef't. TlwrC' will often
lw a ehartPr-part~· between the belligerent GnYernnwnt and the
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()wner or master of the vessel; but it is only a question of proof.
T.he fact of the charter of the vessel entire ~uffices, in whateYer
way it tnay be established." (1916 Naval War College, International Law Topics, p. 109.)

\Vhile so far as the belligerent is concerned, the action
Df a neutral vessel chartered entire by an opposing belligerent would justify treatment of the vessel as an
enemy merchant vessel, it has not been generally held
that any neutral would be placed under special obligations as regards such a vessel. The neutral state whose
flag the chartered vessel is entitled to fly may withdraw
its protection from the vessel, ·but neither that state nor
any other state was committed to taking any special
action on account of unneutral service by the vessel.
The right of a belligerent to prevent or to penalize an
act of a neutral national or vessel does not imply an
obligation on the part of a neutral state to prevent
the act.
Article 12, Habana Convention on jJfariti1ne iVeu.trality.-Article 12 of the Habana Convention on Maritime Neutrality, 1928, is under the section on duties
and rights of belligerents and therefore relates primarily to the action of belligerents. This article
provides that"The neutral vessel shall be seized and in general subjected
to the same treatment as enemy merchantmen:
" (a) When taking a direct part in the hostilities ;
" (b) 'Vhe n at the orders or under the direction of an agent
placed on board by an enemy government;
" (c) When entirely freight-loaded by an enemy government;
"(d) When actually and exclusively destined for transporting enemy troops or for the transmission of information on
behalf of the enemy.
"In the cases dealt with in this article, merchandise belonging to the owner of the vessel or ship shall also be liable to
seizure." (Report,· Delegates· of the United· States,· Sixth -International Conference of American States, p. 220.)

These. provisions are such as would apply to vessels
engaged in unneutral service and are such as have been
applied.
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. A..rtiele 22 of the ·sa1ne conYention proYide:3 that:
·•xeutral ~tate~ are not obligated to preYent the t:xport or
transit at the expensP of any one of the belligeru1t~ of arm~.
omnitions and in general of anything whieh may lJe n~eful to
their military forees.
"'I'ran:-:it shall be permitted when. in the eYent of a war
bPtween two .American nations, one of the belligerents is a
~Ie<literranean country. haYing no other 1neans of supplying
itself, vroYi<le<l the Yital interests of the country through which
tram,it is requested do not suffer by the granting thereof."
( Ibi<l., p. 2~2.)

(a) (2) J'h c ~~~ll)(t'' h~ port of JJ.-1'here has been
bOl11e qne~tion as to the interpretation of the 1028 Habana ConYention on :\Iarititne X eutrality. article 12.
1,his article being under Section II, Duties and Rights
of Belligerents and not under Section III, Rights and
Duties of X entrals applies to treahnent by a belligerent
of a neutral vessel as an ene1ny 1nerchant vessel ~~,vhen
entirely freight-loadel by an enen1y government."
This provision is si1nilar to proYisions in article 4G
of the unratified declaration of London of 1900, but
this article referred to the treahnent of a neutral vessel
by a. belligerent and not to the treatinent of a vessel of
one neutral by another neutral.
1'he fact that t"~o states are at \Yar does not put a
neutral state. under obligation, nor does it give a neutral state the right to interfere \Yith the coinnlerce of
another neutral state. The .Aba, a neutral 1nerchant
Yessel of state .A. , entirely loaded \Yith freight belonging
to state X~ \Yotlld be liable outside neutral jnri~diction
to interference by state Y, but would not be in the
category of vessels of "~ar. I ts cargo bound for state
. A. has a neutral destination and is, so far as state B
is concerned, la ,vful com1nerce.
Transfo1•1nation f'r01n war to 1nerchant vessel.-In
early 1nariti1ne \Yars it \Vas often difficult to distinguish
betw·een vessels \Yhich n1ight engage in \Yar and those
'vhich \Yere engaged in purely peaceful undertaking~.
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. .<\.nned
.
1nerchant vessels and privateers 'Yere the entire
con1ple1nent of son1e fleets sailing against an enemy.
'The transition to the type o:f Yessel solely designed :for
'var purposes "·as slo'v and the professional training o-f
the personnel :for these yessels has been a late deYelopment.
X aturally the trans:for1nation :from merchant vessel
t.o Yesse 1 of "·ar or :fron1 Yessel o:f 'Yar to n1erchant vessel
\Yonld not be a problem till the characteristics of such
vessels 'Yere clearly· 1narked. The distinction in serYice
and in treahnent bec~une more essential as the status of
neutrality deYeloped. The neutral state "·as after a
ti1ne regarded as responsible :for the conduct o:f vessels
vnder belligerent flags 'vhile such vessels were in neutral
ports. It "·as, therefore, essential that the neutral au1horities be able to distinguish betw·een vessels o:f 'var
and 111erchant vessels, since neutral obligations differed
in regard to these classes, and the privileges o:f these
Yessels in a neutral port differed.
(/ on~id e1·a.tion at the Naval lV ao'" 0 ollege.-In 1906,
before the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907,
and after the experiences of the Russo-Japanese 'Var
of 1904-5, the n1atter of need of a clearly established
character particularly for subsidized, auxiliary, and
other ve:-;sels ·which 1night be of special service "·hen
placed under na ,·al control, "·as discussed before the
Naval ''Tar College. The conclusions o:f the Naval ''Tar
College discussion 'vas that •'the use for all purposes of
naval "·arfare, of auxiliary. subsidized. or Yolunteer
vessel~ regularly incorporated in the naval forces of a
country, is in accord 'vith general opinion and practice~ and that this addition to their regular naval forces
in ti1ne o:f ""ar is conte1nplated by nearly all i:f not
all the principal 1naritin1e nations." Convention \TII,
"·hich 'vas drafted at the Second Hague Peace Conference but not signed by the An1erica delegates, recognized that it 'vas probable that tnerchant vessels w·onld
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be incorporated in the fighting fleet in ti1ne of 'var,.
and that it " ·as essential that the character of · such
vessels should be established both for belligerents and
for neutrals. There 'vas, ho"·ever, "Tide divergence of
vie"'" a1nong the states represented at 1"'he Hague in
1907. ..t\ .ustria, France, Ger1nany, and Russia w·ere.
a1nong the states upholding the right of conversion at
sea, 'vhile Great Britain " "'" as among the states opposing·
such conversion.
Article XIV of the ~shington Treaty of 1922 on the
Limitation of Naval Armament definitely refers to
preparations 1nade "In 1nerchant ships in ti1ne of peace
for the installation of warlike ar1na1nents for the purpose of converting such ships into vesse~s of war." This
article limits such preparation to the ·'necessary stiffening of decks for the Inounting of guns not exceeding 6inch caliber", and is binding only on the contracting
parties for the duration of the treaty. Conversion of ·
1nerchant vessels to 'varlike use is, therefore, no'v gei~
erally recognized by n1aritiine states as lawful, and the
Gnly problen1 is oi1e of degree of lin1itation on sech con-

''T

,~ersion.

Discussion at The Hague, 1907.-In the discussion at
the Second Hague Peace Confe!.·ence, 1907, there was
general assent to the right of a belligerent to convert
1nerchant vessels into vessels of war as analagous to enrolling 1nilitia in its forces on land. It was also unaniInously agreed that proper measures for responsible governn1ent control and identification should be taken.
vrery early in the Conference ( J nne 28, 1907) it w·as pro-- .
posed by Dr. La1n1nasch of Austria-Hungary that the
''conversion shall be per1nanent and reconversion into a
1nerchant ship shall be forbidden". Later Dr. LainInasch explained that conversion should be for the
period of the 'Yar and reconversion should be prohibited.
Regarding conversion of a 1nerchant vessel to a vessel
of " '" ar in a neutral port, Lord Reay, of Great Britain,.
said, on July 12, 1907,
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"A vessel whieh should enter a neutral port simply as a ve:-;sel
belonging to the merchant marine and which should leave theport as a war-ship with the necessary commission would have
undergone complete conyersion in neutral waters and would
have increased its value as a fighting unit. But a neutral may
not, without violating the principles of neutrality, permit a
belligerent to increase its value as a fighting vessel in neutral
territorial waters. It follows, therefore, that a neutral State
1uay not permit, under penalty of incurring the same reproach,
a vessel · which enters its territorial waters as a noncombatant
to quit those waters as a war-ship duly authorized by a belligerent State and equipped to take part in hostilities.
"But if the neutral is bound to see that its neutrality is
respected in its territorial waters, the belligerent is likewise
bound to abstain from violating that neutrality. It is therefore
dear that, if the faet of a neutral State's perinitting a belligerent
vessel to be converted into a war-ship within its territorial
waters constitutes a violation of neutrality, it is likewise the
belligerent's duty not to com1nit an act of this kind in neutral
territorial waters, and that any vessel 'vhich has thus been
converted by disregarding the neutral's neutrality and the duties
of a belligerent has not regularly acquired the character of
a war-ship and its status as such must not be recognized."
(III Proceedings, Hague Peace Conferences, Carnegie Endowment translation, p. 812.)

The Japanese representative at the Conference saying that"the question of reconversion is closely related to the que:-;tion
of the place where conversion 1nay be effected,"

remarked also thatr"The only object that the c01nmittee has in n1ind is to dilninish,
so far as possible, the difficulties caused to neutrals by unrestricted conversion and reconversion. In so far as Japan is
concerned she cannot admit the prohibition of reconversion as
long as the war lasts and she prefers to decrease the difficulties
above referred to by restricting the places where conversion or·
reconversion may take place to the restriction of the length of
time which these vessels must observe before they may be reconverted." (III Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences,
Carnegie Endowment for Interna tiona I Peace, p. 993.)

The convention finally agreed upon at The Hague in
1907 left the difficult question "whether the conversion
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of a. nterchaut ship into a "·ar-ship 1nay take place upon
the high seas~' unsettled. 'fhe question of reconversion
'"as also left unsettled.
A·l ftitude on 'reconversion, 190'7.-I'he attitude upon reconYei·sion at the Second Hague Peace Conference 1nay
also be sePn front the discussion in the I~ourth Conunission. Conunittee of Ex<Hnination, on .A.ugust 30, 1907.
"\Yith re~anl to the declaration of conYersion, the President
that there is an Au~tro-Huug:arian propo:-;al whith does
1lot permit recon,·ersion as long- as ho~tilities last.
"H:s ExeelleiH'Y Baron Yon ::\lac~hio ~tate~ th<•t he ha.:; nothingtl' add to tJIC 1-'tatement of reasons for this pro1Josal made by
::\lr. 1~amm<!sch and that he maintains the 11rovo~al.
"His Excellency ::\lr. Keiroku Tsntlzki a!'ks why recon,·er~ion
is 1n·ohibited, inasmuch as it is 11ossible to change the class e,·en
of war-~hip~ during the course of hostilitie~.
"Hi~ ~Jxcellen<.T ::\Ir. HammarskjOld n~plies that the allowing
oi' sneces:-;h·e <.:onYersions and rec01n·ersions of ves&els on the
high seas v:ould cause the most serious diffi~ulties to the neutrals
they encountered, and it is for tJw IHll'}Wse of aYoiding these
diffic·nlties that the Au:-;tro-Hung:arian IH'O})OS!!l has llP~ll vre:Sf'llted.
"His Excellenl'y Lord Heay supvorts the Au:-;tro-Hungarian
l'roposal for the same reasons as those indicated by his Ext·~ llency :\I:·. Hamma rskjuhl.
":\Ir. Fromngeot remarks that the con(lition of pennmH.~nce
aim~ to 11reYent a buS<:'!'; neutrals should 111't be ~;,·en any
nnxiPties on this score.
''Hi:-; fJx(·<•ll(•ner l\.Ir. Keiroku Tsndznki would prefer that the
limitation of tlte rig-ht to ton,·er~ion and ~·ec·onYer~ion should
rtpply not to the right it~elf but to the places wlwre it may be
1 ~·<·alls

(;x~rd!:'ed.

'',Jonkheer Yan Karnebeek recalls the amP~1(1ment 1n·opo!'ed by
l\lexir>o at the :-:eYenth meeting- of the Commi~~ion, ln~·in~ down
(·learly the rule that the prohibition of recouversi0n <llll 1 lie~ only
to thP duration of the war.
"Hi~ Ex~:ellen<"Y ::\It·. Keirokn T~udzuki sees no Jt<·~es:-;ity of
nCC'{'ptin~ the Anstro-Huugarian propo~al as long as the right
of eonYcrsion on the high seas is not recognize(!. It n1ight be
a<.:ceptE'<l only aftet· it has been agreed to admit the principle
of the right of conYersion on the high seas. But ever~ in that
case he doPs not s~e why reconversion in 11ational ports might
not be permitted.
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''The President thinks that untler these circumstances it i..,
to take a vote." (III Proeeedings of the Hague Peace
Conference, Carnebrie Endowment for International Peace translation, p. 009.)
u~eless

British proposal, 1907.-At the Second Hague Peace
Conference, 1907, Great Britain defined the tern1 "warship" as follow·s:
''There are two classes of war-:-:hip:-::
''A. Fighting ship~ ;
"B. Auxiliary vesseb.
"A. The term 'fighting ship' shall include all vessels flying
a rec:ognize<l flag. which are armed at the expense of the State
for the purpose of attacking the enemy, and the officers and
crew of which are duly authotized for this purpose by the
Government to which they belong. It shall not be lawful for a
vessel to assume this character except before its departure fron1
a national port, nor to reli11quish it except after its return to a
national port.
"B. The term 'auxiliary vessel' shall include all merchant
~hiP-c;;:, whether belligerent or neutral, which are used for the
transportation of sailors, munitions of war, fuel, provisions,
water, or any other kind of naval supplies, or which are designed
for tnaking repairs, or charged with the carrying of dispatches
or the transmission of information, if the said vessels are obligefl
to carry out the sailing orders given them, either directly or
indirectly, by a belligerent fleet. The definition shall likewise
i nclnde all vessels used for the transportation of military
troops." (III Proceedings Hague Peace Conferences, p. 1116.)

1"'he British delegate later withdrew the preamble in
regard to two classes of 'varships and explained that 1t
'vas the aim of the British proposal·•to assimilate to the tnilitary vessels of a na ntl force. witb
respect to the treatment to which they are exposed, merchant
f:.hips, whether employed in the service of this fleet for any
purpose or placed under its orders, or serving to transport
troops in any way, thus plainly rendering hostile assistance
to the fleet.~, (Ibid., p. 853.)

lnstit1J.te of International La1v, 1913.-Professor
Fauchille after an exhaustive study presented to the
Institute of International Law at its Oxford Session 111
81178-36--3
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1913 a project :for a 1\fanual of Naval vVar e1nbodying
more than 150 articles.
Articles 11 and 12 of the project were:
"ART. 11. Le navire trans{o1·1ne en navire de guerre conservera
ce caractere tJe?tdant la dun3e des hostilites, et i.l ne pourra
pendant Ce temps etre a nouvea·u, trans{ornuJ en navire 1JUblfc OU
en navire prive.
"ART. 12. Trans{onnation des navires 1nilitai1·es en nav·ires
publics 01t prives.-Un navire 1nilitaire ne peut, tant que. durent
les hosti.Utcs, etre transtormA en navire public ou en navire
prive." (26 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International (1913),

p. 214.)

These articles were among those receiving extended
co1nment which was summarized as follows:
"Aux termes des articles 11 et 12 du projet, taut que durent
les hostilites, un navire public ou prive transforme en batiment
de guerre ne peut reprendre sa premiere qualite pas plus qu'un
bfttiment de guerre ne peut etre transforme en navire public
ou pnve. Ces dispositions ont ete textuelle1nent reproduites
dans le texte de la Commission. Une autre solution eut donne
a un belligerant un moyen trop connnode de faire echapper ses
bli.timents de guerre a la d~struction imminente par son adversaire, et de leur procurer en port neu tre les provisions et le
combustible necessaires.
"Quelques membres de la Commission ont fait remarquer qu'en
definitive !'article 11 n'etait qu'un cas particulier de !'article 12,
et qu'il serait des lors preferable de reunir les deux articles en
un seul, qui, suivant une redaction proposee par l\L Dupuis,
pourrait etre ainsi con~u: 'Les navires de guerre ne peuveot,
pendant la duree des hostilites, etre transform.e s en navires
publics ou prives. Il n'Y a, a cet egard, aucune distinction entre
les navires de guerre qui avaient cette qualite a l'ouverture des
hostilites et ceux qui I' on acquise posterieurement'. 1\Iais, a pres
reflexion, on a decide que, pour plus de clarte, on maintiendrait
dans le projet deux dispositions distinctes.
"Au sujet de la retransformation, 1\f. Edouard Rolin
Jaequemyns a pose a la Commission une question. Si un navire
public ou prive, transfor,m e en batiment de guerre par un
belligerant, est pris par son adversaire, ce dernier peut-il le
retransformer en navire public ou prive? La retransformation ne
doit-elle pas etre defendue qu'au seul belligerant qui a procede
ft la transformation? Cette distinction ne pouvait etre admise
par Ia Commission des lors qu'elle adoptait !'article 12, qui
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stipule d'une maniere generale qu'un batiment de guerre ne
peut, tant que durent les hostilites, etre transforme en navire
public ou prive. Il y a, d'ailleurs, les •memes raisons de decider
dans les deux hypotheses, quel que soit l'auteur de la transformation. La Commission a done tranche la question posee
par ~I. Rolin en decidant que ce qui est interdit dans !'article
11 c'est la retransforn1ation 'par n'importe laquelle des parties
belligerantes'. ~1. Kaufmann avait toutefois insiste particulierement pour que la retransformation ne fut defendue qu'au belUgerant qui a fait la transformation; d'apres lui, le batiment de
guerre d'un belligerant qui est pris par l'ennemi cesse, par le
fait meme de la prise, d'etre un batiment de guerre; et il doit
vouvoir dependre du capteur de faire du navire l'emploi qu'il
jugera convenable.
".1\fais qu'arrivera-t~il si un batiment de guerre a ete, contrairement a la loi, transforme en navire public ou en navire
vrive? Il semble que la transformation, etant iUegale, devrait
etre t'€putee non avenue et qu'ainsi le navire continuera d'etre
un batiment de guerre. Cela est-il toutefois possible? Comment
concevoir qu'un navire puisse avoir la qualite de batiment de
guerre s'il ne remplit aucune des conditions caracteristiques du.
vaissea u de guerre? L' admettre a user, dans ces conditions,
des pouvoirs des navires militaires, ne serait-ce pas enlever toute
sanction a l'acte ilh~gal et, en definitive, autoriser la participation aux hostilites d'autres navires que ceux qui sont vraiment
des batiments de guerre? M:. Kaufn1ann a propose de declarer
qu'un tel navire penh·ait les droits des batiment de guerre mais
en conserverait les charges. ~I. Strisower a estime qu'au point
de vue pratique la proposition de ~:I. Kaufmann entrait dans
des questions qu'il appartenait au juge de resoudre. La difficulte paraissant insoluble, la Commission a, en fin de compte,
decide de la reserver." (Ibid, p. 215.)

As a result of the discussions the ideas of articles
11 and 12 were embodied in article 10 of what came to
be known as the Oxford Manual of Naval 'Var, 1913~
and this article 10 was translated as:
"ARTICLE

10. Conversion of ·u;ar-ships into pu,blic or P'rivate

vessels.-A war-ship may not, while hostilities last, be converted

into a public or private vessel." (Resolutions of the Institute
of International Law, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace translation, p. 176.)

Preca'MtionB against conversion.-The Secretarv of
Commerce of the United States in 1914 took 1neasures
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to prevent conYersion of 1nerchant Yessels into Yessels
of 'Yar in An1erican ports. 'l'hese precautions 'vere in
exc.ess of those usually taken. As l'(\portecl to the Secretary of State, August 6, 1914, the collector of Custoins at. N e"~ York "·as instructed by telegnun as
follo,Ys:
"Have representative of each foreign vPssel in ~·our port
to this Departnwnt wllPther ~he L-; a nwrchant vessel
inte1~ded solely for the carriage <?f 1mssengers and freight,
excluding munitionR of war, or whether slw i:-: a part of tlw
al'lne<l force of her natio11. 'This information i~ for 11urvose of
tnaintainiug: the neutralit~· of the Unitetl States under re('ent
11rocl:una tion Presitlen t. Clea ranee will be refn~ed ill absence
of this certificate.
"'Yire Department before i~suing clearancr- papers to foreign
ve~sels: unle:-:s you are s:a tisfie<l after careful ins:pection that
ship has not made anr vrepara tions while in 11ort tending- in
any wa~· to her conversion into a vessel of war. Takiug- on
abnormal amount of coal, except in ea~e of eolliers, would
indicate such eonvPr~ion. Unt1H('king of guns fllread~· on hoanl
would be conclusive. Painting: of ve~:-:el a wat· eolor would
intlicate conversion. It must b~ clear that she is not to be
used for trans:portation recruits or re:-:erve~ for a foreign ann~·
or nav~·. This does not prevent transportation of pas:~engt'rs in
usual sense, as where there are women and ehil<lren and wen
of different nationalities eYen thoug-h among them there were
a few resen·es witl1out ~·our knowle<lge. If her vassenger~
are nearl~· all men and practically all of same nationality,
elearance cannot be granted. It n1n:-:t he unquestionable that
she has no arms or nu1nitions of war aboard." (1D14, U. S.
Foreign Relations, Supplement, 11. 595.)
c ertif~·

In the instructions of August 10, 1914, signed by the
Secretary of the Treasury and by the Secretary of
Con11nerce, it was stated,
"G. '\Vhen a Yessel of a belligerent power, which llas arrived
a merchant Yessel, alters, or attemvts to alter, her stntus a~
~; merehant yessel or there is reason to belieYe slle intends to
niter such status, so as to become an auxiliary crui::::er or an
:trmed vessel in any degree, ~·ou will immediately notify the
<lepartment by wire, giYing all particulars. Any of the following
~·cts will constitute such a change of status: (a) The placing in
J. o~ition or otherwi:-:e changing the }()(·ation of ~uns which were
af
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ou board the vessel at the time of her arrival; (b) so changing
the appearance, color, rig, or equipment of a vessel as to render
}Jer suitable for some purpose of war; (c) the taking on board
t-.f guns, arms, or ammunition under circumstances which in
any way indicate the outfitting of the vessel for any purpose of
·.,·ar, or in aid of a military expedition." (Ibid, p. 597.)

The P1~inz Eitel Friedrich.-A me1norandun1 of lVIarch
13, 1915, when :Nir. Lansing was counselor of the Departlnent o:£ State, outlines the attitude of the DepartInent upon conversion and use o:£ the flag.
"In a conversation this n1orning with the German Ambassador,
relative to tbe sinking of the Willia·n~ P. Frye hy the Prinz
E-'itel Friedrich, and the presence of the latter vessel at Newport
News, I said to him that I thought this Government h~d shown
the Gcnnan Go\ernment very considerable consideration in regard to the vessel at Newport ~ ews. He a~·.ked me in what
way it had been shown~ to which I replied 'in not seizing the
vessel and arresting the captain for piracy.' He said he did
not understand what I n1eant. I said to him that we had no
proof that the Prin.~ E1~tel . Fried(ich was a German cruiser;
that she, so far as the evidence disclosed, was a Inerchantman;
that we had not been notified of her conveL·sion into a cruiser
and that she did not appear in the list of war vessels of Germany. ThE Ambassador said that she was in com1nand of officers of the Gennan ~avy, to which I replied that so were other
merchant vessels of Gern1an nationality, and that that was no
evidence of her public character. He then said that she was
ftying the r..aval flag of Germany. I answered him that I did
rot think the flag she was flying was any indication of her
character; that he n1ight recall the fact that the cruise1· E·mden
entered a port in the ~lalay Peninsula with a Japanese naval flag
flying, but that that fact did not make the Ent.den a Japanese
war vessel. He asked me what I thought should be done and I
said that I thought this Government should be immediately notified of the conversion of the Prinz Eitel Friedrich into a cruiser
and that she had entered our port as a public ship of Germany
nnd that he further should state whether it was the intention
to make repairs, not to make repairs, or to intern: that in
rase we were not advised that the vessel intended to Inakl'
repairs there was no other recourse but to order her to leaYe
port within twenty-four hours. The Ambassador said be woul<l
give the matter his immediate attention." (1915 U. S. Foreign
Relations, Supplement. p. 824.)
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1"'he Ger1nan A1nbassador asked that the Prin.z Eitel
F1·iedrich be allo,ved to remain in Newport News longer
than 24 hours for necessary repairs, and stated
that she 'yas fonnerly a stea1ner of the North Gern1an
Lloyd and had been conunissioned as an auxiliary cruiser
at Tsingtao according to the seventh convention of The
I-lague, 1907. Fourteen 'vorking days were allo,ved for
putting the vessel in seaworthy condition. In explaining the nature of the repairs in a 1nen1oraPdu1n to the
British Ambassador, a State Department me1norandu1n
of l\Iarch 30, 1915, said,
"As to the point made by the British E1nbassy that the cleaning and painting of the bottom of the Prinz Eitel Friedrich and
the n1aking of engine-room repairs will rna terially increase her
fighting efficiency, it is only necessary to state that this concluflion may be drawn from any work in the na hue of repairs
vf hich Inay be done upon a cruiser while in port, such as repairs
to her steam pipes or to any part of the ship whatever. It is
presumed the ship would not have come into port except to re('(live repairs or to obtain supplies, and therefore it ie not to
be supposed that she would leave the port in the same condition as t.h-=tt in which she arrived, that is, without having her
fighting efficiency increased beyond what it was when she
('ntered.
"The Government has had in n1ind the principle laid down
by ~Ir. Clay, Secretary of State, in the case of the privateer
Junoal which put in at Baltimore for repairs after an action
at sea with a Brazilian cruiser. l\fr. Clay stated:
"''Vhilst you \viii not fail to allo\Y her the usual hospitality,
and to procure the necessary refreshments, the President directs
that you will be careful in preventing any augmentation of her
force and her Innking any repairs not warranted by law. 'Vith
I'espect to the latter article, the reparation of dmnages which
she may have experienced frmn the sea is allo\vable, but the
reparation of those which 1nay have been inflicted in the action
is inadmissable.'
"In the opinion of the Govenunent, a foul bottom is clearly
a damage which the Prinz Eitel Friedrich 'experienced from the
sea.'" (Ibid, p. 830.)

The Prinz Eitel Friedrich 'vas subsequently interned

in the United States.
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Reconversion of interned vessels of W(J)r.-In 1915
question was raised in regard to the repairs and changes
'vhich the Ger1nan authorities desired to have made in
the converted vessels [{ronprinz lVilhel7n and Prinz
Eitel Friedrlch then interned at Norfolk, Virginia. In
the co1nmunication, it was stated,
"Internment conditions should not stand in the way of starting the work, since Article 24 of the second. [thirteenth?]
Hague conYention only nwkes it the duty of a neutral power
to take such 1neasures as it considers necessary to render the
interned ship incapable of taking the sea during the war. The
ship can thus be prevented fron1 putting to sea by re1noving
such parts as are important to her propulsion, screws, cylinder
heads, ~l.nd so forth, and, if, in addition, the neutral state places
the ship's officers and 1nen under sufficient restraint to prevent
them from again joining their home-fighting forces, it discharges all its neutral obligations.
"Internal improvements do not impair the ship's internment
and, in the present case, it is all the more so as the proposed
work will divest the steamers of the characteristics of a warship.
''The repairs do not constitute any· warlike operation but a
purely business proposition, the sole object of which is to save
expenses later." (1915 U. S. Foreign Relations, Supplement,
p. 839.)

In the reply of the Secretary of State to the Ger1nan
Ambas.s ador it was said,

'VASHINGTON,

Decentber 22, 1915.

I have the honor to acknowledge the the receipt, in due course, of your note of November 11, 1915, relative to the applications made by the commanders of the interned German vessels Kronprinz Wilheln~ and Prinz E·itel
Friedrich for permission for those ships to be put in full repair,
and, in the case of the Kronprinz Wilhelnt, for permission to
begin the restoration of passenger accommodations.
"In reply I have the honor to say that, after full reconsideration of the question of the repairs proposed to be made
on these two vessels, I regret to infor1n you that this Government· can not consent to the extensive repairs desired to be
n1ade so long as they involve the reconversion of the vessels
into n1erchant ships and the consequent loss of their naval
-character. The position of this Govern1nent is briefly that
"ExOELLENOY:
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internment applies to vessels stamped with a Bi.l.Yal character,
and so1ne question may arise as to the exercise of the right of
intPrning the Yessels in question and their officers and crews,
if the;y were allowed to assume a merchant character.'' (Ibid,
p. 843.)

Br·itish instructions, 1915.-Certain instructions "·ere
issued for the conduct of artnecl Inerchanhnen on October 20, 1915, but "~ere not 1nade public till March 3,
1916. ..A..1nong these w·as the follo,ving:
" ( 4) The status of a British armed 1nerchant ,·essel can not
he changed upon the high seas." (1017 NaYal "·ar College,
International Law Documents, p. 154.)

Chilean 110te.1915.-In a note to the diplon1atic agents
accredited to Chile, the position of that GoYertllnent
"·as 1nade lnlo\vn upon the subject of reconversion of
auxiliary vessels. In this note it 'vas intimated that
the principles enunciated 'vonlcl be "in confortnity 'vith
the general conYenience of the Atnerican Continent."
".Ministry of Foreign Hela tinns.
Santiago, :\larch 15, 191G.
''To the l\linister:
''This Ininistry has exami11ed with a particular intPrest the
question which bas been submitted to it by the British Government in a note of ]"ebruary 4 last, relating to the J10='Sibility,
for English merchant vessels which have served up till the
JH'esent as auxiliary vessels of the British fleet, to resume their
status of merchant vessels and to be treated in this capacity
in the Chilean jurisdictional waters.
"The Second International Conference of Peace assemhled at
The Hagne in 1907 authorized in convention vii the transforma1ion of merchant vessels into vessels of war, determining at
the same thne measures intended to prevent abuse~ espe~ially
in reference to the ree~tahlislunent of the privateer, abolished
hy the Declaration of Paris of 1856.
"But neither the said conference nor the London Naval Conference of 1909 have regulated all the matters relative to maritime war and notnbly that of the reconversion 1o merchant
vessels of ve~sels which, having fonnerly had this character,
have subsequently been converted into vessels of war or auxiliaries to the armed fleet.
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"Conformably to the general principles of international law
the governments of neutral countries can regulate cases not
vrovided for conventionally and apply in their jurisdictional
waters the regulations which they adopt. The preamble of
convention xiii of The Hague formally recognizes this right.
"The Government of Chile desires to settle the question sug~ested by the note above indicated according to the attitude of
strict neutrality adopted by it since the beginning of the war
and also in conformity with the general convenience of the
.A..Ine1ican Continent, since the g-reat European conflict has
ifemon~trated in an evident 111anner that international rules
~;hould in the future take into consideration the varticular conditions of this hemisphere.
"In~pired by this idea, the Chilean Governn1ent sees no in<·onvenience in admitting into the ports and jurisdictional water!';
of Ghile and in treating in all respects as merchant vessels,
vessels which have been auxiliaries of the fleet of one of the
Lelligerent States. when the said vessels fulfill the following
conditions:
''1. That the auxiliary vessel has not violated Chilean neutrality;
"2. That the reconversion took place in the ports or jurisdictional waters of the country to 'vhich the vessel belongs or in
the J)orts of its allies;
"3. That this was effective; that is to say, that the vessel
neither in its crew nor in its equipment gives evidence that it can
be of service to the armed fleet of its country in the capacity of
nn auxiliary, as it was formerly;
"4. That the Government of the country to 'vhich the vessel
belongs communicates to all interested nations, and in particular to neutrals, the names of auxiliary vessels which have
lost this status to resume that of merchant vessels; and
"5. That the same Government give its word that the said
ves~els are not in the future intende.-1 for the service of the
turned fleet in the capacity of auxiliaries.
Alejandro Lira."
(1916 Naval 'Var College, International Law Topics, p. 28.)

Conversion of auxiliary sluips.-It is evident that the
conversion of auxiliary ships into n1erchant vessels 'vas
conten1plated in 1928 in spite of the opposition which
had been displayed in earlier years. Article 13 of the
Habana Convention on ~1aritin1e Neutrality, to w·hich
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the United States is a. party. under the general section
on Duties and Rights of Belligerents is as follo"~s:
"ARTICLE 13. Auxiliary ships of belligerent:-:, eonn~rteu anew
into merchantmen, shall be achnitted as such in neutral ports
subject to the following conditions:
"1. That the transformed Yessel has not violated the neutrality
of the country where it arriYes;
"2. That the transformation bas been 1nade in the ports or
jurisdictional ''"aters of the country to which the ve~sel belongs,
or in the ports of its allies;
"3. 'That the transformation be genuine, namely, that the ye~
sel show neither in its crew nor in its equipment that it can
serYe the armecl fleet of its country as an auxilian·, as it did
before;
"4. That the government of the country to which the ship
helongs communicate to the states the names of auxiliary craft
whieh have lost such character in order to recoYer that of
merchantn1en ; and
"5. That the same go\ernment obligate itself that said ships
shall not again be used as auxiliaries to the war fleet." (Report
of the American Delegates, Sixth · International Conference of
American States, Habana, 1928, v. 220; post p. 41.)

there might be question as to the propriet~·
of placing this article under the section on duties and
rights of belligerents, by its provisions the article seen1s
to place upon the neutrals certain duties in regarcl to the
admission of converted auxiliary ships.
(a) (3) The '~Xebe" and state B.-The 1928 Habana.
Convention on niaritinle N" eutrality~ article 13, IllUde
provision for adn1ission to neutral ports of auxiliaryships of belligerents "rhich had been converted ane"·
into merchanhnen. The i1nplication ''as that such
ships by conversion reverted to a for1ner n1erchant
status. The events of the \\T orld \Y. ar had brought to
the attention of son1e of the South A1nerican states the
treatment of such vessels in South An1erican ports.
There had been, particularly since the Second Hague
Conference, 1907, n1uch discussion of the rights of conversion of 1nerchant vessels into Yessels of war and their
reconversion. The opinion of states seemed to be gen\ '7 hile
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erally unfavorable to admitting such a right though no
conclusion was reached in 1907.
The 1928 Habana convention article could not be
stated to be a principle o:£ international la'v binding
states not parties to the convention, but merely a conventional agree1nent among parties to the convention.
Unneutral se1"Vice and n.e~ttrals.-Unneutral service
to one belligerent by a neutral Yessel makes that vessel
liable to treatment by the other belligerent as an ene1ny
ve8sel. The neutral state whose flag the vessel flies
assumes no responsibility :for its conduct. It would be
very Clifficult or impossible :for a neutral stat€ to supervise the conduct o:£ all vessels sailing under its flag.
The neutral state does, however, usually notify its
nationals that it "~in not protect then1 in acts which
are contrary to neutrality.
The carriage o:£ contraband is at the risk of the
carrier, the disregard o:£ blockade regulations is at the
risk o:£ the vessel, and engaging in unneutral service
makes the party concerned liable to penalty i:£ taken
by the belligerent. The neutral state 'Youlcl be involved
only when it per1nits in its jurisdiction acts which
might be construed as use o:£ its territory as a base.
Vessels liable to attack.-N ot all enemy vessels are
liable to attack though the right to approa~h and visit
jn time o:£ war is generally a.dmitted except fer neutral
public vessels, and some ene1ny vessels may be attacked
at sight.
Professor Hyde, in referring to public vessels, says:
"The absence of armament on a public "Vessel (not exempt
from capture) has not been deemed to offer a sufficient reason
why an enemy force should not attack it at sight. The exerdse of this right does not appear to be limited to cir~umstances
when attack or destruction is the only means of preYenting·
(•scape. The unarmed public ship seems to be regarded as without the right to demand opportunity to surrender prior to attaek
even under circumstances when neither resistance nor flight
would otherwise be attempted. Thus the existing pr~ctice excuses if not encourages reckless disregard of human life; for
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the burden is on the ship to make special efforts to ~urrender
it is attaeked."
"En~n if it be admitted that the eharacter of a public ship is
1
~~Iwa;\'S suc :l as to justify the en1ployment b~· the enemy of what(ln:~r force is necessary in order to reduce it to controi, it d~es
110t follow that the use of force unnecessary to accomplish that
<.'IHl is always likewise justified. It is believed, therefore, that
the attack upon such a vessel at. sight should be confined to
cases where the immediate use of force appears to be the only
meaus of vreventing the escape of the ship, or of interference
with the attempt to effect its capture by another vessel of the
same belligerent or by some other external force exerted 'in
Hs hehalf. The reasonableness of de1nanding restraint on the
part of the enemy 1nust be apparent in the case where the unarmed public vessel i~, when encountered, known to be employed
on a serviee unrelated to the prosecution of the war." (2 Hyde,
International Law, p. 464.)
t·~fore

Attit1.ule of Ecuador, 1914.-By a decree of November 28, 1914, Ecuador took action beyond that taken in
its proclamation of neutrality of August 17, 1914, in
\vhich it had decreed strict observance of neutrality in
accord \vith the Hague Convention of 1907 on the rights
and duties of neutrals and in accord \vith the principles
of international la\v.
'l'he decree stated that:
"To the rules of the Convention of The Hague, to which the
Government of Ecuador has resolved to conform, are added
the following:
"1st. No tnerchant ship, no n1atter \Vhat be its nationality nor
wllether it belongs to a belligerent country or not, shall be
allowed to leave an Ecuadorian port unless the authorities of
the port have previously obtained fro1n the consul of the nationality to which the ship belongs, a written certificate indicating the next port at which the ship will stop, as also its final
destination, and stating that the ship's voyage is for commercial
purposes only ;
"2d. Whenever a case should arise in which a merchant ship
had left or intended to leave an Ecuadorian port, and· should
have been an unusual time on its voyage to the port of its destination or should have taken an unusual route, or were not to
have taken the direction stated by the consul; or, finally, should
it, uefore rea<·hing port, have changed its cargo, such a ship
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shall be regarded as suspicious and on its next arrival a t an
Ecuadorian port may be detained by the Ecuadorian naval
authorities and is liable to be considered as part of the belligerent forces of the Nation to which it belongs and to be treated
as such." (1916 Naval 'Var College, International Law Topics,
p. 57.)

Nicara,quan attitude, 1914.-In a circular issued by
Nicaragua, Decen1ber 5, 1914, provision 'vas 1nade for
internment of n1erchant vessels regardless of nationality
if their c9ncluct had been such as to involve suspicion.
rfhis circular contained the follo,ving statelnent:
"Fourth, tnercantile vessels of any nationality that arrive at
l':icaraguan ports under suspicious circumstances, such as ha ,·ingmade false staten1ents regarding their destination when ~ailing·
from a port of the Republic on a· forn1er oecasion; being known ,.
by official notice, to have supplied fuel or provisions to war
vessels of belligerents ; having en1ployeLl an excessive length of'
time in their voyage; being painted \vith colors peculiar to war
·v essels or wit_h ~imilarly distincth·e sign~, shall be interned in
1heir rcsve-.:tin~ vorts, the respective authorities of which shall
immediately infonn the Office of Foreign Affairs of the nece:"~ary
ult~rjor measures."
(1916 Naval ".,.ar College, Interna tional
Law Topics, p. 65.) ~
.
· ··
-

Action of A?~genlin.e, 1914-15.-In General OrJers of
Decen1ber 26, 1914, the GoYern1nent of Argentine
decreed,
"ART. 3. 'Vhen it is proven that a merchantman ha:0; t rans-·
ferred, by its own act, to war vessels the fuel ·which it has
ahoard, either as cargo or for its own necessary consumption, it
shall be considered as an auxiliary t,o the war fleet, and the
nuuitime autlwrities shall refuse * * ::< being governed by
considerations of the case * * * to provide coal for th e other
boats in the same company." (1917 Naval 'Var College, Interl~ational Law Documents, p. 30.)

By a decree of ,Jan nary 22, 1915, intern1nent ''as decreed for a vessel of belligerent nationality w·hich had
nccon1panied the Gern1an fleet,
"From conclusions based upon the adjoined docuinents signed
by the captain of the German steamer Seydlitz upon putting in
at the port of San Antonio Oeste, and by the captain of the
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English bark Drummuir upon his disembarkation at the harbor
of this city that the first-named stean1er n1ade part of the
German South Atlantic and Pacific division from the 3d to the
8th of September last, to which it was ordered to go by the chief
of that naval force, having on board the cre'v of the bark sunk
by the cruiser Leipzig, for which circumstance it should be
considered as an auxiliary boat of the German diYision, and for
this reason unat·le to remain in an Argentine port n1ore than
twenty-four hours without infringing the neutrality laws.
"Tlze President of the A.?"gentine Nation decrees that:

"ARTICLE 1. The n1inister of the navy shall take action to have
t he German stean1er Seydlitz, which has taken refuge in the port
of San Antonio Oeste since the 18th of last December, convoyed
by an Argentine yessel to Puerto ~Iilitar, where it shall be interned until the end of the present war." (Ibid, p. 31.)

The . . .-\. rgentine GoYerninent also interned other vessels
engaged in auxiliary service o£ the belligerents.
Supplying vessels of 'war at sea.-In ~1arch 1915 by a
joint resolution, Congress ailned to re.:>trict tl1e :furnishing o:£ supplies :£rom A1nerican ports to belliger0nt vessels o£ war at sea. The resolution was stated as follows:
"Rcsol,;ecl by the Senate and House ol Rcpre:-;entati,;es of the
United States of A-merica in Congress assembled, That, from and

after the passage of this resolution, and during the existence of
a war to which the United States is not a party, and in order to
preYent the neutrality of the united States from being violated
by the use of its territory, its ports, or its territorial waters as
the base of operations for the armed forces of a belligerent, contral-y to the obligations imposed by the la''" of nations, the
treaties to which the united States is a party, or contrary to
the statutes of the United States, the President be, and he is
herelJy, authorized and empo,Yered to direct the collectors of
cust01ns under the jurisdiction of the United States to withhold
clearance from an;\· Yessel, American or foreign, which he has
r easonable cause to lJelieYe to be about to carry fuel, arms, ammunition, men, or supplies to anr warship, or tender, or ~upply
ship of a belligerent nation, in Yiolation of the obligations of
the United States as a neutral nation.
;'In ease any such Yessel shall depart or attempt to depart
fr01n the jurisdiction of the United States without clearance
for any of the purposes aboYe set forth, the owner 0r n1aster
or person or persons haYing charge or command of such Yessel
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~hall

severally be liable to a fine of not less than $2,000 nor
more than $10,000, or to imprisonment not to exceed two years,
or both, and, in addition, su~h vessel . shall be forfeited to the
United States.
"That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby,
fluthorized and empowered to employ such part of the land or
naval forces of the United States as shall be necessary to
carry out the purposes of this resolution.
"That. the provisions of this resolution shall be deemed to
extend to all land and water, continental or insular, within the
jurisdiction of the United States.
"Approved, ~Iarcb 4, 1915." (1915 U. S. Foreign Relations,
Supplement, p. 851; 38 U. S. Stat., p. 1226.)
Tl~e

"Fa1·n," 1915.-The Ji'arn, a British steamer, left

Cardiff about September 5, 1914, with a provision '~in
her charter to deliver coal to 'varships if they so desired." The F arn 'vas captured and a German prize
crew was put on board. The Farn, or f{D-3 as she
seems to have been called, "~as for about 3 months used
by the German captors when she put in to San Juan,
Porto Rico, for provisions and water. The United
States Government decided to treat the FaYJon as an
auxiliary in service of the German fleet.
As the F arn had not been condemned by a prize court,
the British Ambassador maintained that the F arn
should be treated as a prize which should be released
under article 21 of Hague Convention XIII of 1907.
The reply of the Secretary of State was that, as a result
of investigation, it had been determined to order the
vessel to leave port within 24 hours, and "upon failure
to leave, that the vessel, together with the prize officers
and cre'v, be interned, the British officers and crew and
the Chinese seamen being released."
"Later, in reply to a further communication of the
British Ambassador, the Department of State said:
"Your excellency states that it would be necessary before
the vessel could be treated as a German fleet auxiliary that
she should have been condemned by a competent prize court.
'Vith this conclusion the Government of the United States is
under the ~ecessity of disagreeing. In the opinion of this
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GoYernment an enemy vessel which has been captured b~· a
belligerent cruiser becomes as between the two governments th3
propert)· of the captor wjthout the intervention of a prize court.
lf no prize court is available this Government does not under~tancl that it is the duty of the captor to release his prize, or
to refn~e to impress her into its service. On the contrary, the
captor would be ren1i:-.:s in his duty to his Government and to the
l•fficiency of its belligerent 011eq~tions if he released an enemy
vPssel because he could not take her in for adjudication.
"As to Article 21 of Hague ConYention No. XIII of '1!)()7 cited
by ~·our excellency as prescribing the treatment to he accorde(l
to the Farn, it is only necessary to state that as it appears that
His l\lajesty's Government has not ratified this conYention it
should not be regarded as of binding effect betwPt>n Great
Britain and the Uniterl States.
"In this relation I venture to call to your attention that the
Briti~b Consul at San Juan vrotested on January 12 against the
clearnnce of the Farn, and that ~Tour excellency in your note
of January 13 requested that she be detained in the intere~t
of neutrality. It was not until January 17 that your excellency
infonned the Department that His l\Iajest~T's Government presurned that the United States would act under Article 21 of
Hague Convention No. XIII of 1007 in regard to the release of
the vessel. Sufficient time had thus elapsed to allow for communieation with British warships and their appearance off the
port of San Juan. The result of releasing a German prize
loaded with coal at this juncture needs no comment.
"In the circumstances the Government of the United States
is under the necessity of adhering to its decision to intern
nntil the end of the war the stearnship Farn as a fleet auxiliary.''
(1915 U. S. Foreign Relations, Sul)plement, p. 823.)

H abana 0 onvention on 111aritin~e 1Veutrality~ 1.928.rfhe Habana ConYention on ~Iaritiille N entrality of
February 20, 1928, "·as . ratified by the United States
and proclain1ecl in 1932 (Treat~T Series 845). 1,his
conYention had been considered at the Sixth International Conference of An1erican States. ..A. s the report of
the delegates of the United States o£ .A. 1nerica states:
"The result was a n1odified draft, in large measure that of
the thirteenth convention of the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907, with sundry modifications and additions in onler
to take note of the n1easures which neutrals bad taken to pre-
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sen·e their rights during the 'Vorld 'Var. As finally drafted
and originally adopted, the project presupposed a war, in which
the A1nelican Republics would be neutral. For this reason it
was indispensable that the practice of nations shoulu be strictly
ob~f\rved, as it would be undesirable on the part of the American
states to attempt to change the general rights of all neutrals
by a speeial agreement of their own. There is, however, an
American Republic without access to the sea. The Bolivian
delegation proposed a 1nodification of the general rule in case·
of war ·between American Republics, to the effeet that the project should contain a clause, by virtue whereof neutral states
should be obliged to permit the transporhttion of materials of
\Var through their territories to an American state thus shut
off from the sea. provided the neutral !'tates should not consider
that their vital interests were affected. Th~ delegation of tlw
Unitell States conceived this to b~ a just 1wovision under the
circumstances, aiHl vote<l for it. It was adopted as the second
parngraph of Article 22, with a reservation on the part of Chile.
"The Argentine delegation proposed in cmnmittee an1enrlments
which it had suggested in the subcom1nittee. One of these, to
the effect that armed merchantmen should be assimilated to.
auxiliary vessels in the service of belligerents, was carried and
forms the last sentence of Article 12 of the convention. To this,
the United States interposed a reservation, as did likewise Cuba
and Uruguay. The convention was adopted in the plenary
session of February 18, Chile and the United States expressly
maintaining at the time of signing, their respective reservations." (Report of the Delegates of the United States of
Anwrica to the Sixth International Conference of A1nerican
States (1928), p. 18.)

(b) The "Dobo" and co1n1nerce of state Y.-Article·
22 of the 1928 Habana Convention on Maritime Neutrality makes provision in regard to co1nmerce between
neutral and belligerents. This article also makes special
provision :for certain American states in regard to
transit o:f goods.
In general neutral states are not under obligation to·
prevent shipments of cargo :from their ports though
the destination and character o:f the cargo may be determining :factors in the treatment o:f the shipments by
the belligerents. Habitual use of a neutral port as a
source of supply :for belligerent vessels o:f 'var 1nay give
81178-36--4
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rise to questions in regard to the use of neutral territory
as a base but the shipment of cargo from a belligerent
port to a neutral port would not involve such questions.
A neutral vessel which delivers supplies to a belligerent vessel of war Inay be considered by the opposing
belligerent to haYe engaged in unneutral service but the
risk rests upon the neutral vessel. Such a vessel would
not be regarded as an auxiliary of the navy of the
belligerent which would iinply c~nversion, a recognized
procedure in international la""· Unneutral serYice by a
neutral vessel does not put neutral states under obligations, but gives the belligerent rights of capture.
Asyhtm in neutral ports.-The question of a2ylum has
long been a subject of discussion. The lnstitut de Droit
International ahnost fron1 its founding in 1873 gave
attention to n1atters relating to capture, prize, and treatJnent of belligerent vessels by neutrals. Alnong the resolutions adopted in 189~ after discussion 'Yas the following on the Regulations Concerning the Legal Status
of Ships and their Crews in Foreign Ports:
"ARTICLE 24. Granting of asylum to belliger~nts in r..eutral
ports, although depending upon the pleasure of the soYereign
State and not required of it, shall be presumed, unless previous
notification to the contrary bas been given.
"'Vith regard to war-ships, however, it shall be limited to
cases of real distress, in consequence of: 1. defeat, sickness, or
insufficient crew; 2. perils of the sea; 3. lack of the means of
subsistence or locomotion (water, coal, proYisions) ; 4. need of
repairs.
"A belligerent ship taking refuge in a neutral port from pursuit
by the enemy, or after having been defeated by him, or bec-ause
it bas not a sufficient cre\Y to ren1ain at sea, shall remain therein
until the end of the war. The same rule shall apply if it is
carrying sick or wounded, and after having landed them, is in
condition to go into action. The sick and wounded, though
received and cared for, shall, after they have recovered, be also
interned, unless considered unfit for Inilitary service.
"Refuge from the perils of the sea shall be granted to warsLips of belligerents only so long as the danger lasts. No
g•eater quantity of water, coal, food or other analogous sup-
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plies shall be furnished them than is necessary to enable them
to reach their nearest national port. Repairs shall not be allowed
except so far as necessary to enable them to put to sea. Immediately thereafter the ship shall leave the port and neutral
waters.n (Resolutions of the Institute of International Law,
Carnegie Endo\vment for International Peace translation, p. 154.)

In the discussion o:f this article M. l{leen, one of the
reporters upon the subject, referred to the third paragraph,
"Quant a l'asile a accorder aux navires en fuite, la solution
du problen1e devient plus difficile encore que lorsqu'il s'agit de
cas de detresse par suite d'en~nements naturels. A defaut
d'occasions, on ne possede pas, a rna connaissance, un seul exemple de leur internement dans le port oft ils se sont refugies
devant l'ennemi, a l'instar de c~ qui se passe sur terre. ~lais
il est clair que si, dans les conditions actuelles, les neutres perInettaient aux batiments cmnbattants de se refugier chez eux
devant nne poursuite ou apres une defaite, pour en ressortir
apres dans des conditions plus favorables, l'autre belligerant
addresserait des reclamations tres vives au souverain du port
devenu ainsi un point d'appui pour lui arracher les fruits de
sa superiorite. Dans la doctrine, on s'est peu occupe de la
question; toutefois, ceux qui l'ont resolue dans le Ineme sens
que !'article ci-dessus, sont assez nornbreux et considerables pour
faire autorite.
"La permission pour un na vire belligerant de retourner au
combat apres avoir complete son equipage dans un port neutre
fiquivaudrz:tit evidemment a nne aide d'enrOlement, tont marin
~ur un batiment de guerre pouvant participer au combat."
(17
Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International, 1898, p. 68.)

The question o:f asylum in neutral ports again received
the attention o:f the Institute. in 1910 and was discussed
in this Naval "\~Var College in 1911 (1911 Naval \Var
College, International Law Situations, pp. 9-36).
Ame1~ican treaties.-Many American treaties o:f the
nineteenth century had been similar to the treaty between the United States and Peru o:f 1887:
"ARTICLE XIII. \Vhen through stress of we:1ther, want of water
or provisions, pursuit of enemies or pirates, the vessels of one
of the high contracting parties, whether of war, (public or private.) or of trade, or employed in fislling, shall be forced to
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seek ~belter in the ports, riYers, bays, and (~ominions of the
ether, they shall be re~eiYed and treated with humanity; suffident time shall be allowed for the completion of repeirs, and
"bile anr Yes~el 1nay be undergoing them, its cargo shall not
unnecessarily be required to be landed eit~1er in whole or in
part; all assistance aud protection shall be giYen to enable the
Yessel to procure supplies, and to place them in a condition to
pursue t.heir ,-oyage without obstacle or hindranc-e." (25 Stat.,
] 44-!, 1450.}

The case of the ';Pisa.."-In a note of the Gennan
En1bassy, ~larch 26, 1915~ it "·as stated that the Pi8a
of the Ha1nburg-...~Inerican Line "·as to apply for clearance papers fron1 Ne,v York to Han1burg and that the
Pisa "·onlcl try to co1nn1unicate 'vith a Gern1an cruiser
in the ...~tlantic, to "·hich it "·as Inaintainecl no objection could be 1nade as no Gennnn vessel of 'var had
taken supplies in this region "·ithin three 1nonths. 'fhe
Gennan E1nbassy referred to the note of the DepartInent of State, Dece1nber 24, 1914, in "·hich it ''"as
stated that
"the e~seutial idea of neutral territorr becoming the base for
WlYal overations by a lwlligerent i~, in the ovinion of thb:
GoYernment, repeated departure frmn sueh territory of merchant ve~sels laden with fuel or other suv11lies for belli~erent
warships at sea.~' (191-1 U. S. Foreign Helations, ~Ul1J1lenwnt~
}1. 648.)

Of this the Genna n note of

~I arch

26, 1915, said,

"As already Inentione<l, no supplies for the German men-ofwar inYoln~tl here left the Unitetl State:; of Anwriea within
the la~t three n1onths. The words 'for belligerent war~llip:.-;
at sea' n1ake it clear, that it is immaterial whether the war=-:hip
to be suvplied is in 11ort. off a 11ort or on the high sea. As
a n1a tter of fact in all three ca8e!': the onl~· <.lifference would
he in the distance co,·ere<l by the SUl1IJly-cai-r~·ing f'OuYe.ntuce.
Therefore no international law or agreen1ent establishes ~uch
a difference. Nor is there an~· distinction made hetwt>en furui~hing supplies for a home journey or any other Jnu·po~P.
In
fact, according to international law, tlwre seems to be only on~
restrictitJn put to sup11lying belligerPnt warships: that onP :-;hip
can not be SUPIJliE'd from the sa me neutral vort tnore than once
within three months.
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''It is olJYiou~ that it is for the party nwking the charge
that such supplies have been ftu·nished more than once within
thn.~ months, to prove the charge by substantiated evidence.
"The Embassy must a~sume that the rules laid down in :\Ir.
Brf~iil's note of December 24, 1014 are still in force.
The
resolution passed by Congress and promulgated on :\larch 4,
does not seem to alter any existing laws, out appears to empo,ver the Executive to enforce laws already in existence."
( 1915 U. S. Foreign Relations, Suppleinent, p. 85D.)

In replying to this state1nent, the Acting Secretary
of State, on April 10, 1915, said:
''The Incmorandum quotes fron1 tbe Department's note of December 24 last to the effect that the essentia'l idea of neutral
territory becon1ing the base for naval operations is r~peated
{!eparture fron1 such territory of n1erchant vessels laden with
fuel or other supplies for belligerent warships at sea, and the
memorandam draws the conclusion from Hague Convention No.
XIII of 1007, that the word 'repeated' means ;more than once in
three months.' The argument appears to be that, inasn1uch as
no supplies for German n1en-of-war have left the United States
within three Inonths, no objection ought to be raised to the
dearance of the Pisa though it is admitted that she intends to
transfer her cargo, if possible, to a German cruiser on the high
~ eas.

"It is true t.hat the Deparhnenfs note of Dec~mber 24 discussed the 1neaning of 'base of operations,' but it was also
pointed out that the obYious result of the practice of sending
-supplies to warships at sea, would be that such warships could
rPmain on their stations engaged in belligerent operations with•Jut the inco:nyenience of repairing to port for supplies. Both of
these assertions must be considered as they present different
l'hases of the same question. It is the opinion of thi~ GovernJnent that the result of supplying warships in order that they
n1ay avoid the danger or inconvenience of vi-;iting a neetral port
' "ould be in contravention of the rules of international law and
~he provisions of Hague Convention No. XIII. Both Articles 19
t1nd 20 of that convention indicate unquestionably that the coaling of warships from stores gathered at a neutral port or roadstead :is ·to · take ·place 'in that port or roadstead, and these pro,•isions are regarded as consonant with the existing rules of international law on the subject. It is obvious that to carry fuel
nnd supplies to a warship on its station at sea is not furnishing
her wit.h fuel \Yithin a neutral port. I am, therefore, under the
necessity of disagreeing with your statement that 'it is hnma-
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terial whether the warship to be supplied is fn port, off port, or

c,n the higll seas.'
"The reasons for this rule are evident, when its application
is considered. In the first place, as only sutlicient coal and
supplies 1nay be furnished a warship to enable it to reach
its nearest h01ne 11ort, neutrals 1nnst, in order to <.letern1ine the
amount, be specifically advised of the size of the vessel, the
number of the crew, the a1nount of fuel and supplies already on
board, and the place of trans~hipn1ent. 'Vithont knowledge of
these facts it would be impossible to limit the cargo of a
vessel so that the warship could not take on board more coal
or SU11Plies than the rule of international law pennit-.;. In
the second vlace after the departure of a supply boat fro1u the
jurisdiction of the United States, this Government would have
no control over the vessel to prevent delivery to a different
warshi11 frmn the one sup})Osed to be entitled to replenislunentt
even though 1 h<' supplies furnished far exceeded the amount
pennitted by international law. In the third place, as a belligerent \varship n1ay not, in any event, supply itself in the ports
of a neutral power more than once in three 1nonths, a neutral
government, ·before allowing coal and supplies to be takPn to a
belligerent warship from its ports, should be sati~fied that
none had been obtained by the sanw vessel within the precee<-1iug three 1nonths. This information can be had onl~· frOin the
warship itself, unless it bas during the period entered a neutral
port, or been in direct com1nunication therewith. In any event
the amount of the stores to be supplied, and the time when
they n1ay properly be furnished are questions of fact, and not
1na tters of presumption.
"Furthermore, the allowance of coal and supplies by a neutral
to a belligerent warship is based on the 1wesumption that the
latter intends to return to its home })ort. There can, howevert
be no such presumption in the 11resent case. In fact the presumption is that no German warship would attempt to return
home when there is a virtual investinent of German ports by
hostile naval forces. On the contrary it 1nay be assumed with
reasonable certainty that a German warship which remains on
the high seas, purposes to take supplies in order to continue
hostile operations against vessels of belligerent nationality and
to intercept and search neutral vessels. If, therefore, such a.
warship is supplied with an nnwunt of coal and supplies in
excess of the amount permitted by la \Y, the neutral territory
from which such stores are derived, would clearly constitute
a depot for the projection of the naval operations of a belligerent in contravention of the rules of international law nnrl
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862.)

Ent1'·ance of vessels of war in ti1ne of peace.-Wbile
it was formerly cominon·to per1nit foreign vessel~ of war
to enter ports in time of peace, in recent years restrictions have been placed on such '3ntry. This is partly
due to the change in the character of vess~ls of war fro1n
the comparatively weak sailing vessels to the battleships
of modern navies.
Regulations varying in strictness 'vere general even
before the 'Vorld 1Var. The customary requirement was
prior diplomatic notice, sometimes of a specified number
o£ days.
Certain nan1ed ports were closed to entrance of vessels
of vvar and sometin1es to Ine:fchant vessels also.
The restriction as to the nun1ber of vessels that might
enter in tin1e of peace was also con1n1on. The time of
sojourn was usually specified.
Of course, local port regulations 'vere to be observed
by visiting vessels of war, and quarantine regulations
also prevailed even for public vessels.
To closed ports admission in time of peace 1nay be
1Jermitted to vessels in distress for fillY reason. The
argu1nent is that the rights of humanity take precedence over regulations dictated by political or strategic
expediency. ln time of war the sa1ne liberality of interpretation does not prevail.
Norwegian rules, 1912.-The Nor,vegian rules of December 18, 1912, in time of peace proclaimed that,
"'Var vessels of belligerent powers are permitted to enter
vorts and roadsteads as well as other territorial waters of the
kingdom. At the smne time admission is subject to the exceptions, restrictions, and conditions which follow:
"1. (a) It is forbidden belligerent war vessels to enter the
ports and roadsteads of war, which have been proclaimed as
such.
"(b) It is also forbidden such vessels to enter inner territorial 'vaters whose entrances are closed by submarine 1nines
er other ~means of defense.
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'' (e) The King rel:lerYes the right to forbid under the same
conditions to the two belligerent 11arties, acces~ to other Nor"·egian ports or roadsteads and other defined parts of the
interior Xorwegian waters. when spe(·ial circumstances demand
and for ~afeguardin~ the soYereign ri~hts of the kingdom and
tc maintain its neutrality.
" (d) The King al~o reserYes the right to forltid acc-ess to
vorts and roa(bteads of the kingdom to helligerent war ves~els
whieh have neglected to conform to rules and pl'~('l'iiHionR
promulgated by the competent authorities of the kingdom and
which ha ,.e viola ted itR neutrality.'' ( 1H17 ~a val 'Yar College,
International Law Documents, p. 18-:l.)

. .A. general regulation applied to all "·arships of for·e ign nationality as prescribed in royal ordinances of
January 20, 1912, . A. ugust 21, and Septetnber 11, 1914.
"Xo foreign war vessels exce11t those mentioned in article 4
-can enter the Xorwegian war ports or naval stations without
11aving obtained the authorization of His :Majesty the King
-or of the persons authorized by hiln to this effect.
•'It is necessary to indicate in advance the types and names
nf war vessels for whicll the authorization to enter Norwegian
war ports or naval stations is solicited, as well as the date of
arrival and duration of sojourn.
"'Vithout special authorization in extraordinary cases the
sojourn in a war port or naYal station can not exceed eight
-dayR, and in general no more than three war vessels belonging
to the same nation will be permitted to sojourn simultaneously
in the same port." (Ibid, p. 187.)

The excepted classes 1nentioned under article 4 'vere :
"(a) Every war vessel on which the Chief of State of a foreign nation is traveling and the -vessels which conYoy it.
"(b) 'Var vessels which find themselves in immediate danger
fr01n the sea, which are always permitted to have recourse to
the ports of the kingdom.
·' (c) 'Yar vessels intended for or engaged in the surveillance
of fisheries or of hydrographic work and other scientific objects."
(Ibid, p. 188.)

Similar rules 'vere issued by other Scandina.vian
states.
R·ules in lVo1·ld lVar.-The rules announced by neutral states during the 'Vorld ''Tar varied somewhat,
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but usually ai1ned to restrict repairs to a li1nit which
,voulcl not 1nake the port a base and thus n1ake the
neutral state liable.
'The Brazilian rules stated on August 4, 1914,
"ART. 13th. The belligerent warships are allowed to repair
their datnages in the ports and harbors of Brazil only to the
extent of rendering them seaworthy, without in any wise augmenting their military power.
"The Brazilian naval authorities will ascertain the nature
aud extent of the proper repairs, which shall be 1nade as
prOinptly as possible." (1916 Naval War College, International
Law Topics, p. 11.)

The procla1nations of other state.s 'vere to si1nilar
effect.
In the discussion of sojoui·n for repairs at the Second
Hague Peace Conference, 1907, the Brazilian delegation presented a lengthy meinoranduin upon asylu1n in
neutral ports in course of which it 'vas said,
" ( 7) 'Vhen a belligerent \Var-ship takes refuge in a neutral
110rt or territorial waters, to escape pursuit by its enemy. if it
is unable to cmnplete the necessary re11airs or to take on sufficient supplies to enable it to put to sea within the IWrio<l alI<,wecl it, that is to say twenty-four hours, it is prefer.:.1ble. as a
guaranty, for the neutral State to intern it until the eud of
the war.
"T.hat is the surest way of conforming to the true Rpirit of
ueutralit;v. This wonltl not be too rigorous a proceeding. for the
necessity of closing the ports to these vessels would thus be
avoidei.l. which closing n1ight entail heavy damages, and moret:n er the complications "·hich the difficult;)' of this deli{'ate question might lead to would be avoitled.
"'Ve cau here proceed in the same manner only in the case
of vessels in distress as the result of <lamage caused by the
c.r,IHlition of the sea.
"In this last case the solution accept0d by all is to allo'v the
'essel admitted under these conditions to devart freely; but if
· this is done and if in a partkular case the vessel is given refuge,
this would be a first infringement of the principle of the inviolability of neutral })orts an<l waters, which jnfringement
would nn tnrally be regarded ns complete, if the belligerent Yessel
is not subsequent!;\· required to lle11art upon the ex11iration of

50

YESSELS AXD XEUTRAL PORTS

the customary period of twenty-four hours in these ports or
waters.
''Humanitarian considerations should undoubtedly dedde neutrals to re('€iYe a pursued belligerent Yessel, this aHl being indisvensable to enable it to es~ape a danger which might seriously
jeopardize the situation of those on board or expose the '\"essel
1G f'ertain loss unless it takes refuge in the 5rst port it comes to.
"But when this duty is once perfonned and the established
rules coYering the matter haYe been set aside to ¢ve way only
to Christian sentilnents, which demand not only that the Yessel
bP admitted, but even that the neutral go to its aid to save it
maintenance of his neutrality by the neutral requires that these
Yessels be held in the neutral's ports and ''aters and disarmed
there, and that they shall not take any further part in hostilities for the duration of the "~ar." (III Proceooings Hague
Jleace Conferences. Carnegi~ Endowment translat1L·n, p. 586.)

. A.t the Second Hague Peace Conference frequent
n1ention had been n1acle of the rules of the Treaty of
\ \7 ashington of 1871 under 'vhich the Alaba1rUl award
had been 1nade. The British proposal on the subject ot
asylum from enemy pursuit had been as follo"Ts:
15. When a war '\"essel of a belligerent takes refuge
jn neutral waters in order to escape pursuit by the enemy it
is incumbent upon the Go'\"ernment of the neutral State to intern it until the end of the war." (Ibid, p. 699.)
"ARTICLE

Article 17 of the Hague Con\ention XIII which was
~tel opted by the conference in 1907 proYicles:
"In neutral ports and roadsteads belligerent war-ships may
only carry out such repairs as are absolutely necessary to render
them sea,Yorthy, and may not add in any manner whatsoever to
their fighting force. The local authorities of the neutral Power
shall decide what repairs are necessary, and these must be
~arried out with the least possible delay."

This rule has been generally reaffirmed.
1Vetherlands declaration, 1911,.-~Vhile opposition 'vas
voiced against the Nether lands declaration of August
5., 1914.' the Netherlands GoYerninent continued to enforce its provisions in order to ensure its neutrality.
Articles 4 and 5 of this declaration provide the general
rule and the exception.
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"ART. 4. No ·warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to

nny of the belligerents shall have access to the said territory.
"ART. 5. The provisions of article 4 do not apply to:
"1. Warships or ships assimilated thereto which are forced to
enter the ports or roadsteacs of the State on account of damages
Dr the state of the sea. Such ships may leave the said ports
or roadsteads as soon as the circumstances which have driven
them to take shelter there shall have ceased to exist.
"2. Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a
belligerent· ·which anchor in a port or roadstead in the colonies
or oversea possessions exclusively with the object of completing
their. provision of foodstuffs or fuel. These ships must leave as
soon as the circumstances 'vhich have forced them to anchor
shall have ceased to exist, subject to the condition that their
f-:tay in the roadstead or port shall not exceed 24 hours.
"3. \Varships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a
belligerent employed exclusively on a religious, scientific, or
humanitarian mission." (1916 Naval War College, International
Law Topics, p. 62.)

In article 5 there is a distinction made between admission to the continental waters (art. 5-l) and admission
to waters o:f the colonies or overseas possessions (art.
5-2). In the first case, exception is made :for "damages
or the state o:f the sea." In the colonies and overseas
possessions, exception is made :for :fuel and :foodstuffs.
Owing to the limited coast line and :few ports, it could
not be expected that belligerents who had used any
reasonable degree o:f care would be compelled to resort
to a Dutch port :for supplies or :fuel.
United States-Panama agreement, October 10, 1914.During the period before the United States entered the
World War, questions in regard to the treatment o:f vessels entering ports under American jurisdiction o:ften
arose. In the relations between the United States and
Panama a protocol stated the attitude o:f these parties.
"Protocol of an agreement concluded between Honorable
Robert "Lansing, ·Acting Secretary of State of the United · States,·
and Don Eusebio A. l\lorales, Envoy Extraordinary and l\finister Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Panama, signed the tenth
<lay of October, 1914.
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"The undersigned, the Acting Secretary of State of the
United States of Atnerica and the Envoy Extraordinary and
:Minister Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Pananw, in view
of the close association of the interests of their respective Gov·
Prrunents on the Isthmus of Pananw, and to the end that these
interests may be conserved and that, when a state of war exists,
the neutral obligations of both Governments as neutrals n1ay be
maintained, after having conferred on the subject and being
duly empowered by their respective Governments, have agreed:
"That hcspitality extended in the waters of the Republic of
1-'anmna to a be1liger~nt vessel of \Var or a vt>ssel bellig01·eut or
ueutral, whether armed or not, which is employed by a lJelligcrent power as a trausport or fleet auxiliary or in any other
way for t.he dirett vurpose of prosecuting or aiding· ho:-;tilities.
whether by land or sea, shall serve to deprive ~uch ves:.-el of
like hospitnlit~· iu the Panmna Canal Zone for a period of three
m.on ths, and rice versa-.
In testimony whereof, the undersigned have signed and scaled
the present Protocol in the <'ity of 'Vashington, this tenth day
ef October, 1914.
ROBE:R.T LANSING

EUSEBIO .A. l\loRALES"
(1916 Naval 'Yar College, International Law Topics, p. 94;

38 Stat. 2042.) .

In accord 'vith this protocol a neutral vessel. "'"hether
er not ar1ned, if directly e1nployed for aiding hostilities
by land or sea n1ight, so far as sojourn in the Canal Zone
or in Panan1a is concerned, be treated as a belligerent
Yessel of "rar.
Proclam~a.tion, 1Voven1.ber 13. 1914.-In rules 1 and 2
of the proclan1ation of the President of the United
States, N ove1nber 13, 1914, rel::1ting to the neutrality of
the Panama Canal Zone, the attitude of the United
States 'vas even n1ore clearly stated than jn the protocol
,vjth Pan~una of October 10, 1914.
"RuJc l. A vessel of war, for the purpos~s of these rules, iR
defined as follows: a public armed Ye~sel. under the command
of an officer duly com1nissioned by the goYernment, w.hose name
appears on the list of officers of the Inilitary fleet, and the crew
of which are under regular naval discipline, which vessel is
qualified b~· its armament and the character of its per:-;onnel to
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t;.:ke offen3h·e action against the public or lH'iYate ships of the
(nerny.
"Rule 2. In order to nutintain both the nentralit~· of the Canal
and that of the United States owning and operatiug it as a
go,·ernment euterprise, the same treatment, extept as herein~~fter noted, m; t.hat giYen to Yessels of war of the bel!igerents
shall be given to e,·er~· yes~el, belligerE'nt or neutral, whether
anned or not, that does not fall under the definition of Rule 1,
whieh Yessel is employed by a belligerent Power as a transport
ur fleet auxi1iary or in any other way for the direct purpose of
1•rosecuting or aiding hostilities, whether by land or sea ; but
~;u~h treatment shall not he giYen to a Yessel fitted up and used
Pxclusively as a hospital ship." (1916 NaYal \Yar College, International Law Topics) p. H7; 38 Stat. 2039.)

Other rules of this proclan1ation provide for the san1e
trea.bnent in passage, taking supplies, fuel, etc., for
"vessels of 'var of a belligerent or vessels falling under
rule 2." Even in case of distress, vessels "falling under
rule 2·' "·ere subject to the sa1ne restrictions as ve~sels of
"·ar.
(c) The ".LYioi" in. a closed neut1·al port.-In tin1e of
'va.r the extension of restrictions upon the n1oven1ents
of belligerent public vessels in neutral 'vaters has been
common. A state 'vhether in ti1ne of peace or of 'var
has jurisdiction over its territorial "·aters. As the characte_r of ·· instrtunents of "·ar has changed, regulations
and responsibilities have changed. It "·as found essential for neutrals to n1ake different regulations for the
sojourn and departure of vessels of "~ar under sail and
under stea1n as "~ell as for aircraft.
Ports closed to conunerce are supposed to be closed to
all vessels. In a naval closed port the control and often
the ownership of the fuel is usually in the government .
...--\..ny aid to a belligerent naval vessel in a neutral closed
port 'vould be of the nature of aid by neutral public
authority which is not la,vful.
SOLUTIOX

(a) 1. 1,he X ara 1nay re1nain in the port of neutral
state B for 24 hours unless state B has preYiously issued
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special regulations. During the 24:..hour sojourn the
Xara may make such repairs as possible using the personnel ancl1naterial on board. After 24 hours the Xa1·a
should be interned.
2. Unless neutral state B has previously issued special
1·egulations, it 1nay not decline to allo\V to the Aba the
usual priYileges granted to neutral merchant vessels in
its harbors.
3. If neutral state B and belligerent state X are not
bound by special treaty agree1nent, and if state B has
not previously issued special regulations, state B may
legally decline to adn1it, except under the rules for vessels of \var, the Xebe \vhich has been transfor1ned fron1
a supply to a 1nerchant vessel.
(b) There is no obligation on the part of state E or
(jther neutral states to treat the Dobo as an auxiliary of
the navy of state Y.
(c) If the X ibi, a vessel of \var of state X, enters in
distress a closed port of neutral state E, the X ibi should
be. interned or may be allowed or required to. depart
under pledge to take no further part in the war.

